fix(32.2): WR-03 refuse an unknown MCPGrant.Subject instead of treating it as a user grant

pier now resolves only the empty subject (frontend user grant) and pact.MCPGrantSubjectBackend; any other value is ErrUnauthorized and never reaches the linked-administrator lookup.
This commit is contained in:
Jakub Zych
2026-11-21 09:11:46 +01:00
parent 1dcc2ed06d
commit 19bb3f9485
6 changed files with 18 additions and 6 deletions

View File

@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ What pier does with it at boot:
Every request is authorized afresh from its bearer; a session never replaces the bearer. An OAuth access token of the application's authorization server (`oas_at_…`) is verified through the `pact.MCPTokenVerifier` the OAuth server plugin publishes: the grant's user is the frontend subject, the grant's scopes are the ceiling. With the `backend` scope and a link the published `pact.MCPLinkedBackendResolver` confirms, the linked administrator is the backend subject, resolved on every request (cached for at most five seconds on one instance and dropped at once by a link event), so unlinking takes effect on the next call with no token surgery. The verifier also reports which administrator the user consented to (`pact.MCPGrant.BackendUserID`); while the link names anyone else, or when the grant records none, the grant has no backend subject, so a link that changes after the consent never re-targets it. The backend principal keeps the administrator's real permissions, superuser included, under the grant's ceiling.
An application without frontend users can sign administrators in directly. The OAuth server plugin then issues administrator-only grants: the verifier answers `pact.MCPGrant.Subject` as `pact.MCPGrantSubjectBackend`, `UserID` 0 and the administrator in `pact.MCPGrant.BackendUserID`. Such a grant has only a backend subject, taken straight from the grant with no link lookup, and its sessions are bound to `oauth:backend:<client_id>:<admin_id>`, so two administrators of one client never share a session. The read/write ceiling does not apply; instead the subject is `pact.MCPSubject.ScopeLimited`, and the backend guard caps it with the same scope limit an administrator's `g15_` token with those scopes gets: a grant of `admin:read` lists and runs only the routes that limit allows for `GET`. A grant that names neither a frontend user nor an administrator is refused. Grants of linked frontend users are unchanged.
An application without frontend users can sign administrators in directly. The OAuth server plugin then issues administrator-only grants: the verifier answers `pact.MCPGrant.Subject` as `pact.MCPGrantSubjectBackend`, `UserID` 0 and the administrator in `pact.MCPGrant.BackendUserID`. Such a grant has only a backend subject, taken straight from the grant with no link lookup, and its sessions are bound to `oauth:backend:<client_id>:<admin_id>`, so two administrators of one client never share a session. The read/write ceiling does not apply; instead the subject is `pact.MCPSubject.ScopeLimited`, and the backend guard caps it with the same scope limit an administrator's `g15_` token with those scopes gets: a grant of `admin:read` lists and runs only the routes that limit allows for `GET`. A grant that names neither a frontend user nor an administrator is refused, and so is a grant whose `pact.MCPGrant.Subject` is any value other than empty or `pact.MCPGrantSubjectBackend`. Grants of linked frontend users are unchanged.
The `read` and `write` scopes are a ceiling, and that ceiling is unchanged: a grant with only `read` sees tools whose read-only hint is true, `write` unlocks the rest, and permissions always filter on top. The `ai` and `offline_access` scopes play no part in it. `pact.MCPSubject.Scopes` on a call is the grant, not an implied expansion of `pact.FrontendTokenScope.Implies`.