fix(32.2): WR-02 refuse a ConsentPath that is not a same-origin path

Add wristband.CheckConsentPath (additive, for hosts to call at boot) and make Authorize answer 500 before storing a pending request while the configured path fails it, so the handoff can never leave the issuer's origin.
This commit is contained in:
Jakub Zych
2026-11-21 09:08:12 +01:00
parent fa7a84821e
commit 1dcc2ed06d
5 changed files with 91 additions and 3 deletions

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@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ The metadata document advertises these paths under the issuer, so mount them at
## Consent
The authorization endpoint sends the browser to `<issuer>/connect?request=<id>`, or to `wristband.Options.ConsentPath` on the issuer when the application sets one (for a consent page under the admin prefix, for example); an empty path keeps the PHP bytes exactly. A request that names no data scope gets `read`, or `wristband.Options.DefaultScopes` filtered to the accepted scopes when that list leaves anything; a server that accepts neither refuses it with `invalid_scope`. With `wristband.Options.DefaultScopes` set, a request that names only `offline_access` gets those scopes too and keeps offline access. That page belongs to the application: it signs the user in, shows what the client asks for and posts the decision to the application's own consent handler, which calls:
The authorization endpoint sends the browser to `<issuer>/connect?request=<id>`, or to `wristband.Options.ConsentPath` on the issuer when the application sets one (for a consent page under the admin prefix, for example); an empty path keeps the PHP bytes exactly. The path must be a plain same-origin absolute path (`wristband.CheckConsentPath`, which the application can call at boot); while it is not, authorize answers 500 instead of redirecting. A request that names no data scope gets `read`, or `wristband.Options.DefaultScopes` filtered to the accepted scopes when that list leaves anything; a server that accepts neither refuses it with `invalid_scope`. With `wristband.Options.DefaultScopes` set, a request that names only `offline_access` gets those scopes too and keeps offline access. That page belongs to the application: it signs the user in, shows what the client asks for and posts the decision to the application's own consent handler, which calls:
- `wristband.Server.PendingRequest` to read what to show, as a `wristband.PendingRequestView`, including `wristband.PendingRequestView.OfflineAccess` (the pending row's flag; `offline_access` is not a scope on the view and `wristband.Server.IssueCode` is unchanged);
- `wristband.Server.IssueCode` to grant, which returns the redirect URL carrying the code, `iss` and `state`;

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@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ func providerRoutes(r pact.Router, srv *wristband.Server) {
| `wristband.RefreshTokenStore` | Persists `wristband.RefreshTokenRecord` lineage rows, including rotation and lineage revocation. |
| `wristband.AccessTokenIssuer` | Mints and revokes the application's access tokens, returning a `wristband.IssuedToken`. |
| `wristband.IssueClientCredentials` | Generates a client ID and, for confidential clients, a one-time secret and its hash. |
| `wristband.CheckConsentPath` | Returns why a path cannot be `wristband.Options.ConsentPath` (it must start with a single `/` and carry no `?`, `#`, `\`, `@`, whitespace or control character), or nil; call it at boot. `wristband.Server.Authorize` answers 500 instead of redirecting while the configured path fails it. |
| `wristband.RejectRedirectURI` | Returns why a redirect URI is not acceptable, or an empty string. |
| `wristband.ErrPendingNotFound` | The pending request does not exist for this user or is no longer usable. |
| `wristband.ErrNoGrantableScopes` | `wristband.Server.IssueCode` was called with no scopes. |
@@ -204,7 +205,7 @@ wristband reads no config keys or environment variables; the application passes
| `wristband.Options.CodeTTL` | 10 minutes |
| `wristband.Options.AccessTokenTTL` | 1 hour |
| `wristband.Options.RefreshTokenTTL` | 30 days |
| `wristband.Options.ConsentPath` | none (empty), which hands authorize off to `/connect` on the issuer, byte for byte as the PHP server; a set path (for example `/admin/connect`) replaces `/connect` on the same issuer |
| `wristband.Options.ConsentPath` | none (empty), which hands authorize off to `/connect` on the issuer, byte for byte as the PHP server; a set path (for example `/admin/connect`) replaces `/connect` on the same issuer; it must pass `wristband.CheckConsentPath` |
| `wristband.Options.DefaultScopes` | none (empty), which keeps the PHP fallback `read` for a request that names no data scope (`invalid_scope` when `read` is not accepted); a set list is filtered to the accepted scopes and replaces `read` when anything is left, and then also applies to a request that names only `offline_access` |
Always set `wristband.Options.Issuer` and `wristband.Options.Resource` for your deployment. While `wristband.Options.Resource` is empty, an MCP authorization request that sends `resource` is refused with `invalid_target`.

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@@ -161,6 +161,13 @@ func (s *Server) Authorize(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
dataScopes = append(dataScopes, sc)
}
// A ConsentPath that is not a same-origin absolute path could send the
// browser, with the pending request id, off the issuer's origin; refuse
// before storing anything (fail closed, CheckConsentPath).
if err := CheckConsentPath(s.opts.ConsentPath); err != nil {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
requestID, err := s.randomBytes(32)
if err != nil {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
@@ -196,6 +203,27 @@ func (s *Server) Authorize(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
writeRedirectHTML(w, http.StatusFound, spa)
}
// CheckConsentPath reports why p cannot be Options.ConsentPath, or nil. The
// path is appended to Issuer as given, so it must be an absolute path on
// the issuer's origin: it starts with one "/" (not "//"), and carries no
// "?", "#", "\", "@", whitespace or control character, any of which could
// move the handoff to another host or break its query. An empty path (the
// PHP "/connect") is valid. A host calls it at boot to refuse a bad
// configuration early; Authorize answers 500 instead of redirecting while
// the configured path fails it.
func CheckConsentPath(p string) error {
if p == "" {
return nil
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(p, "/") || strings.HasPrefix(p, "//") {
return fmt.Errorf("wristband: ConsentPath %q must be an absolute path starting with a single /", p)
}
if strings.ContainsAny(p, "?#\\@") || strings.ContainsFunc(p, func(r rune) bool { return r <= ' ' || r == 0x7f }) {
return fmt.Errorf("wristband: ConsentPath %q must be a plain same-origin path", p)
}
return nil
}
// consentPath is the path the authorize handoff appends to Issuer:
// Options.ConsentPath, or the PHP "/connect" while it is empty.
func (s *Server) consentPath() string {

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@@ -241,3 +241,60 @@ func TestAuthorizeDefaultScopes(t *testing.T) {
}
})
}
// TestCheckConsentPath locks the WR-02 guard: Options.ConsentPath is
// appended to Issuer as given, so only a plain same-origin absolute path is
// accepted, and Authorize answers 500 without storing a pending request or
// sending a Location while the configured path fails it.
func TestCheckConsentPath(t *testing.T) {
for _, ok := range []string{"", "/connect", "/backend/connect", "/gfadmin/mcp/connect", "/a%20b"} {
if err := CheckConsentPath(ok); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CheckConsentPath(%q) = %v, want nil", ok, err)
}
}
for _, bad := range []string{
"@evil.example/connect",
"backend/connect",
"//evil.example/connect",
"/\\evil.example",
"/connect?x=1",
"/connect#frag",
"/user@evil.example",
"/con nect",
"/connect\n",
"/connect\x7f",
} {
if err := CheckConsentPath(bad); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("CheckConsentPath(%q) = nil, want an error", bad)
}
}
t.Run("authorize refuses an invalid path without a handoff", func(t *testing.T) {
backend := newMemoryBackend()
opts := DefaultOptions()
opts.Issuer = "https://app.example"
opts.Resource = opts.Issuer + "/mcp"
opts.ConsentPath = "@evil.example/connect"
srv := NewServer(opts)
srv.SetBackend(backend)
insertAuthorizeTestClient(backend, "cli", []string{authorizeTestRedirect}, nil)
_, challenge := s256Pair(t)
q := url.Values{}
q.Set("client_id", "cli")
q.Set("redirect_uri", authorizeTestRedirect)
q.Set("response_type", "code")
q.Set("code_challenge", challenge)
q.Set("code_challenge_method", "S256")
q.Set("scope", "read")
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.Authorize(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth/mcp/authorize?"+q.Encode(), nil))
if rec.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError || rec.Header().Get("Location") != "" {
t.Fatalf("authorize = %d Location %q, want 500 and no Location", rec.Code, rec.Header().Get("Location"))
}
backend.mu.Lock()
defer backend.mu.Unlock()
if len(backend.codes) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("authorize stored %d pending requests, want none", len(backend.codes))
}
})
}

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@@ -96,7 +96,9 @@ type Options struct {
// authorize request. Empty or unset means "/connect", the PHP handoff,
// so the redirect bytes stay identical to the PHP server. A host whose
// consent page lives elsewhere on the same origin (for example under
// the admin prefix) sets the path here. The OIDC flavour ignores it.
// the admin prefix) sets the path here; it must pass CheckConsentPath,
// and Authorize answers 500 instead of redirecting while it does not.
// The OIDC flavour ignores it.
ConsentPath string
// DefaultScopes is what an MCP authorize request gets when it names no