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docs(phase-16.2): add security threat verification

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Jakub Zych
2026-10-28 13:59:44 +01:00
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---
phase: "16.2"
slug: "plugin-provided-field-types-and-the-blog-editor-formwidget"
status: verified
# threats_open = count of OPEN threats at or above workflow.security_block_on severity (the blocking gate)
threats_open: 0
asvs_level: 1
created: "2026-10-28"
---
# Phase 16.2 — Security
> Per-phase security contract: threat register, accepted risks, and audit trail.
Paths are relative to the meta repo (`summercms.go/`, `sm-journal-plugin/`, `vue-journal-layer/`, `sm-grzybyfunkcjonalne-app/`). Code was checked at each repo's HEAD; for code that later moved (the site-cache purger now lives in `summercms.go/modules/cooler`), the 16.2 release commit `5eea57f` was checked too.
---
## Trust Boundaries
| Boundary | Description | Data Crossing |
|----------|-------------|---------------|
| admin browser → cabana admin API | Save bodies, upload bodies and field-type requests (cookie or Bearer session) | field values in every locale, uploaded files |
| plugin Go code → cabana | Decode, Load, ListValue and Upload run inside cabana's handlers and save transaction | decoded values, plugin errors and notices |
| plugin element JS → admin SPA DOM | The element runs in the admin origin under CSP `script-src 'self'` | `value` property, plain attributes, `summer-upload` events |
| stored post HTML → admin editor DOM | Imported or previously saved HTML is parsed into the editor | untrusted HTML |
| admin save body → Journal Decode | Every locale's content value crosses here through cabana | HTML to sanitize |
| editor upload → media bucket | User files become public URLs under `/storage/app/uploads/public` | image bytes, object keys |
| Journal API `content_html` → site `v-html` | Stored HTML becomes page markup | HTML, embed placeholders |
| site page → youtube-nocookie.com | The visitor's browser loads a third-party frame | referrer, visitor IP |
| Go host → Nuxt (loopback HTTP) | Journal calls the layer purge route with a bearer token | purge token, slug |
| internet → nginx → Nuxt | Visitors reach Nuxt with GET/HEAD only; nginx adds forwarding headers | requests, X-Forwarded-For |
| npm registry → plugin build | `@tiptap/*` packages enter the committed bundle | third-party code |
| executor → git origin / UAT server | Tags and pushes read by other repos; release runs next to the live Winter site | tags, binaries, `.env` secrets (server only) |
---
## Threat Register
| Threat ID | Category | Component | Severity | Disposition | Mitigation | Status |
|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------|------------|--------|
| T-16.2-01 | Spoofing | compileFieldTypes alias registry | high | mitigate | `summercms.go/modules/cabana/field_type.go:106` refuses core aliases, `:166-171` refuses a cross-plugin alias naming both owners, `:172` checkWidgetTag (prefix check `extension.go:346`) | closed |
| T-16.2-02 | Tampering (stored XSS) | decodePluginFields | high | mitigate | `crud.go:830-852` runs it inside the save transaction; `field_type.go:465/489/511` decode host value and every locale; only skip is the served-value match `:539-541`, which writes nothing | closed |
| T-16.2-03 | Elevation of Privilege | fieldUpload route | high | mitigate | `http.go:452` requireAjax; `field_type_upload.go:35` protect (guard and permissions `http.go:1216-1225`), `:49/:142-160` field/context check and 404 without Upload, `:124` loadRecord scope; `auth.go:253` SameSite=Strict | closed |
| T-16.2-04 | Denial of Service | fieldUpload body | medium | mitigate | `field_type_upload.go:69` MaxBytesReader on `upload_bytes`, `:85/:168-177` exactly one part, `:200-204` 413 | closed |
| T-16.2-05 | Information Disclosure | PluginField / element | high | mitigate | `admin/src/components/form/fields/PluginField.vue:63-65,76-84` value and plain attributes only, upload via SPA `api.POST` `:133`; test `admin/tests/form/PluginField.test.ts:103` | closed |
| T-16.2-06 | Tampering | typeOptions to element | low | mitigate | `PluginField.vue:44,81` JSON attribute string; no `v-html` | closed |
| T-16.2-07 | Information Disclosure | plugin errors | medium | mitigate | `field_type.go:669-686` only `*pact.FormFieldError` → 422; `:690-693` and `:727-729` opaque 500 | closed |
| T-16.2-08 | Tampering | untouched skip | low | accept | See AR-16.2-01 | closed |
| T-16.2-33 | Tampering (admin XSS) / DoS | save notices | medium | mitigate | `admin/src/components/form/FormField.vue:86`, `ui/Toast.vue:34` text interpolation only; `field_type.go:40-42,799,811` 10 notices per field/locale, 500 runes; test `FormField.test.ts:50` | closed |
| T-16.2-09 | Elevation of Privilege (admin XSS) | rawHtml node view | high | mitigate | `sm-journal-plugin/assets/src/blogeditor/extensions.ts:301,315` textContent; parse in inert document `:270-273`; test `tests/blogeditor/smoke.test.ts:135` | closed |
| T-16.2-10 | Tampering (stored XSS) | Source tab and pasted HTML | high | mitigate | `classes/blog_editor.go:164` SanitizeHTMLReport on every locale; admin `FormView.vue:478` adopts the stored value; layer `PostBody.vue:13` sanitizes again | closed |
| T-16.2-11 | Tampering | link mark | medium | mitigate | `extensions.ts:42-63` isPolicyUrl (control chars removed first), `:545`; `element.ts:465,570`; tests `smoke.test.ts:417-424` | closed |
| T-16.2-12 | Elevation of Privilege | bundle under admin CSP | medium | mitigate | no `eval(`/`new Function(` in `assets/dist/blogeditor.js`; `element.ts:202` `injectCSS: false`; CSS scoped under `golem15-journal-blogeditor` | closed |
| T-16.2-13 | Information Disclosure | uploads | high | mitigate | `element.ts:559` dispatches `summer-upload {id, file}` only; no fetch, XHR, cookie or storage access in `assets/src/blogeditor` | closed |
| T-16.2-14 | Tampering (stored XSS) | decodeBlogHTML (posts, categories) | high | mitigate | `blog_editor.go:154-166`; `models/post/fields.yaml:19`, `models/category/fields.yaml:28`; tests `posts_admin_smoke_test.go:360`, `categories_admin_editor_test.go:56` | closed |
| T-16.2-31 | Tampering (stored XSS) | newHTMLPolicy editor-output extension | high | mitigate | `classes/format_html.go:63-72`, exactly four AllowAttrs added since `c60abc6`; 16.1 policy tests unchanged; `editor_policy_test.go:68` | closed |
| T-16.2-34 | Denial of Service | SanitizeHTMLReport and removal notices | low | mitigate | `format_html.go:105` (`maxRemovalNames = 10`), `:145-153`; cabana cap (T-16.2-33) | closed |
| T-16.2-15 | Tampering / Elevation | uploadBlogImage | high | mitigate | `media_store.go:89-93` allowlist without svg, `:20,98-104` 10240 KiB cap; `blog_editor.go:365-375` DetectContentType; staging vhost `:89` nosniff | closed |
| T-16.2-16 | Tampering | upload keys | medium | mitigate | `blog_editor.go:129-147` folder check at boot, `:397-426` safeUploadName; `media_store.go:155,193-224` never overwrites | closed |
| T-16.2-17 | Repudiation / contract | public posts and media routes | medium | mitigate | `controllers/api/posts_helpers.go`, `posts.go`, `routes.go` unchanged `c60abc6..5eea57f`; `api/media.go:43-63` keeps body and errors | closed |
| T-16.2-18 | Information Disclosure | content_html companion writes | low | mitigate | `controllers/posts.go:216-224,271-308` written locales only, in the transaction | closed |
| T-16.2-19 | Tampering (iframe injection) | expandEmbeds | high | mitigate | `vue-journal-layer/app/utils/embeds.ts:41` exact regex, `:51` provider allowlist, `:53` id pattern, `:29` fixed host | closed |
| T-16.2-20 | Elevation of Privilege | sanitize-then-expand order | high | mitigate | `Journal/PostBody.vue:13`, `CategoryHeader.vue:11` `expandEmbeds(sanitizeJournalHtml(...))`, no other caller; gate `check-phase16.2.sh:123` | closed |
| T-16.2-32 | Tampering (policy drift) | htmlGate.ts mirror | high | mitigate | `app/utils/htmlGate.ts:68-71,122-127`, only these rules since `294a8d8`; corpus copies identical (`cmp`) | closed |
| T-16.2-21 | Information Disclosure (visitor privacy) | YouTube frame | low | mitigate | `embeds.ts:29,57-58` nocookie host, lazy, strict-origin-when-cross-origin; staging vhost `:93` frame-src (report-only; server install pending, WINDOWS 19) | closed |
| T-16.2-22 | Tampering / Repudiation | layer tag and pushes | medium | mitigate | v0.2.0 annotated (`042b65d → 759e684`); `scripts/check-git-install.sh`; 04-SUMMARY records `check-git-install: ok` and pushed heads | closed |
| T-16.2-23 | Tampering (false-green release) | release gate | medium | mitigate | 05-SUMMARY `release-gate-ok`, Docker-only suites listed, human reply "release v0.1.18" | closed |
| T-16.2-24 | Tampering / Repudiation | annotated tag and pushes | high | mitigate | v0.1.18 annotated (`04dc5bd → f1d8a75`), contains plan 01 head `4adb48a`; binary sha256 matched; heads on origin | closed |
| T-16.2-25 | Information Disclosure | credentials | high | mitigate | `sm-grzybyfunkcjonalne-app/DEPLOY.md:74` no `.env` rsync; no env file tracked; `.gitignore:5`; 05-SUMMARY no auth gates | closed |
| T-16.2-26 | Tampering | UAT database and Winter site | medium | mitigate | 05-SUMMARY: SELECT-only checks, `.prev` rollback copies kept | closed |
| T-16.2-35 | Tampering | UAT strip check | low | mitigate | Strip verified (05-SUMMARY edit-ok); test post `uat-16-2-blog-editor` (id 105) deleted by the user on 2026-10-28 | closed |
| T-16.2-27 | Elevation of Privilege | sudo on the server | low | accept | See AR-16.2-02 | closed |
| T-16.2-28 | Tampering | test isolation | low | mitigate | `sm-journal-plugin/vite.config.ts:38`; memblob, testcontainers; no ssh, curl or child_process in tests | closed |
| T-16.2-29 | Repudiation (false green) | phase gate | medium | mitigate | `summercms.go/scripts/check-phase16.2.sh:143-270` detectors, `:376-450` self-test, `:570-586` NOT RUN and `PHASE162_REQUIRE_POSTGRES` | closed |
| T-16.2-30 | Tampering (security regression) | strip, policy, permission tests | medium | mitigate | `check-phase16.2.sh:64-130` named tests, `:479-482` 16.1 policy tests pinned to `c60abc6`, `:502` corpus `cmp` | closed |
| T-16.2-36 | Spoofing / DoS | layer purge route | medium | mitigate | `server/api/__journal__/cache/purge.post.ts:25-30`; `app/utils/siteCache.ts:39` 32-char minimum, `:40` proxied → 404, `:43` timingSafeEqual over sha256; staging vhost `:236-239` `limit_except`; 07-SUMMARY purge-ok `200 83 403 401` | closed |
| T-16.2-37 | Information Disclosure | purge token | high | mitigate | log-capture tests `5eea57f:classes/site_cache_test.go:158-162`, now `modules/cooler/sitecache_test.go:257`; `DEPLOY.md:86,210-213` urandom/printf, `-H @-`; only `token-match` crossed ssh. See Follow-ups for a later leak path | closed |
| T-16.2-38 | Tampering (stale content) | purge ordering | medium | mitigate | lagoon.AfterCommit `5eea57f:classes/site_cache.go:181`, now `cooler/sitecache.go:306`; tests `site_cache_admin_test.go:162,240` | closed |
| T-16.2-39 | Denial of Service | admin save path | low | mitigate | 2 s WithTimeout(WithoutCancel) `cooler/sitecache.go:32,159`; tests `site_cache_admin_test.go:319,349` | closed |
| T-16.2-40 | Information Disclosure | purge URL misconfiguration | medium | mitigate | `cooler/sitecache.go:82-109` (was `site_cache.go:57-84`): both-or-neither, no userinfo or fragment, http only to loopback, 32-char token | closed |
| T-16.2-41 | Tampering (log injection) | layer purge log line | low | mitigate | `siteCache.ts:83` strips control chars, `:14` 200-char slug cap | closed |
| T-16.2-42 | Tampering (cache poisoning) | Nitro route cache | medium | mitigate | `nuxt.config.ts:77` `cache: false`; `purge.post.ts:18` no-store; `testing/purge-check.mjs:175-184` | closed |
| T-16.2-43 | Denial of Service | full route-cache purge | low | accept | See AR-16.2-03 | closed |
| T-16.2-44 | Repudiation (false-green gate) | phase gate | medium | mitigate | `check-phase16.2.sh:72,88,93,557,565`; VALIDATION 07-T3 green with `PHASE162_REQUIRE_POSTGRES=1` | closed |
| T-16.2-45 | Tampering / Repudiation | tags and pushes | high | mitigate | v0.1.20 (`ad7981f → aba063f`), layer v0.3.0 (`c09e0d0 → 25e9bfe`) match 07-SUMMARY; heads on origin; sha256 matched; site lockfile `3a920c7` resolves to `25e9bfe` | closed |
| T-16.2-46 | Tampering | UAT database and Winter site | medium | mitigate | 07-SUMMARY: read-only snapshots, human-only data changes, deploy-ok `.prev` rollback checks | closed |
| T-16.2-SC | Tampering | packages (all seven plans) | high | mitigate | 01, 03, 06: no dependency file changes; 02: exact `@tiptap/*` pins 3.31.4, committed lockfile, `scripts/check-dist.sh` rebuild diff, human "packages approved"; 04, 07: layer version bump and pin only, `node:crypto` only; 05: `build.sh:53` `--frozen-lockfile` | closed |
*Status: open · closed · open — below high threshold (non-blocking)*
*Severity: critical > high > medium > low — only open threats at or above workflow.security_block_on count toward threats_open*
*Disposition: mitigate (implementation required) · accept (documented risk) · transfer (third-party)*
---
## Accepted Risks Log
| Risk ID | Threat Ref | Rationale | Accepted By | Date |
|---------|------------|-----------|-------------|------|
| AR-16.2-01 | T-16.2-08 | Submitting the served value only skips the write; the skip cannot store anything Decode did not already accept (`field_type.go:539-541`) | plan 16.2-01 threat model; reconfirmed by audit | 2026-10-28 |
| AR-16.2-02 | T-16.2-27 | Server sudo is limited to `nginx -t`, nginx reload and supervisorctl (`DEPLOY.md:34`); the release used supervisorctl only | plan 16.2-05 threat model; reconfirmed by audit | 2026-10-28 |
| AR-16.2-03 | T-16.2-43 | Only authenticated loopback callers can purge; admin saves are rare; each page re-renders once from the local API | plan 16.2-07 threat model; reconfirmed by audit | 2026-10-28 |
*Accepted risks do not resurface in future audit runs.*
---
## Follow-ups (outside the 16.2 register)
- **Purge token likely exposed on UAT (later regression, not 16.2 code).** The site app pins vue-journal-layer v0.4.0, which brings `@nuxtjs/seo` / nuxt-site-config; that copies every `NUXT_SITE_*` variable into page payloads, and `sm-grzybyfunkcjonalne-app/DEPLOY.md:86` names the token `NUXT_SITE_CACHE_PURGE_TOKEN`. Fixed in the layer at v0.6.0 (`e0cc871`). Not checked on the live server. Action: bump the pin to ≥ v0.6.0, rename to `NUXT_CACHE_PURGE_TOKEN`, rotate the token.
- **Surface added after planning, no threat ID:** Blog Editor preview pane (empty-sandbox `srcdoc` iframe with CSP meta, `sm-journal-plugin/assets/src/blogeditor/preview.ts:6-14,190`, accepted in UAT test 5); admin "View site" link (`admin/src/components/shell/AppShell.vue:80-81`, `noopener noreferrer`); visitor X-Forwarded-For forwarded to Go on cached renders (`vue-journal-layer/server/plugins/journal-client-address.ts`, commit `03a90e9`).
- **Housekeeping:** WINDOWS entry 19 still needs the staging vhost install (frame-src); the test-post part is done. 16.2-VALIDATION rows 07-T4..T6 still read pending although 07-SUMMARY records them as passed.
---
## Security Audit Trail
| Audit Date | Threats Total | Closed | Open | Run By |
|------------|---------------|--------|------|--------|
| 2026-10-28 | 47 | 47 | 0 | msd-security-auditor (retroactive, State B); T-16.2-35 closed after the user deleted UAT post 105 |
---
## Sign-Off
- [x] All threats have a disposition (mitigate / accept / transfer)
- [x] Accepted risks documented in Accepted Risks Log
- [x] `threats_open: 0` confirmed
- [x] `status: verified` set in frontmatter
**Approval:** verified 2026-10-28