docs(phase-13): add security threat verification

.planning/phases/13-p-ytarium-api-wishlist-notifications-csv-credentials-public/13-SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+---
+phase: "13"
+slug: "p-ytarium-api-wishlist-notifications-csv-credentials-public"
+status: verified
+# threats_open = count of OPEN threats at or above workflow.security_block_on severity (the blocking gate)
+threats_open: 0
+threats_total: 37
+threats_closed: 37
+accepted_risks: 2
+asvs_level: 1
+block_on: high
+register_authored_at_plan_time: true
+created: "2026-10-12"
+---
+
+# Phase 13 — Security
+
+> Per-phase security contract: threat register, accepted risks, and audit trail.
+
+This file is the gate contract built from the six `<threat_model>` blocks and the SUMMARY `## Threat Flags` sections. No SUMMARY flags a threat outside its plan's register. `13-SECURITY-REVIEW.md` (2026-10-03, written by the 13-06 executor) has the per-threat findings, the named test evidence and the 31 removal checks (RC-01 to RC-31). T-13-SC appears in every plan and is counted once, with its strictest entry (13-04, medium, mitigate: the direct `golang.org/x/text` requirement). Framework paths are relative to `summercms.go/`. App paths are relative to `fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/`.
+
+---
+
+## Trust Boundaries
+
+| Boundary | Description | Data Crossing |
+|----------|-------------|---------------|
+| HTTP request path → surf dispatch | Untrusted path segments select the handler and its middleware chain of an overlapping route family | path segments |
+| Request write transaction → River queue | Queued jobs wait for Phase 14 workers; they must neither fail the write nor be lost | job args |
+| Recorded fixtures and goldens → tide comparison | Masks decide what the parity diff may ignore | dates, publication ids |
+| Isolated PHP SQLite → row goldens | The parity `rows` subcommand reads the parity database | test rows, share tokens |
+| Anonymous client → onboarding, invitation inspection and public share routes | Unauthenticated input creates the first owner, probes invitation tokens and resolves share tokens | e-mails, passwords (high), share and invitation tokens |
+| JWT client → notifications, credentials, wishlists, CSV imports | A user reaches only their own rows and peers' rows through visibility scopes; org writes need owner/admin | identifiers, field values |
+| Personal token → token-group wishlist routes | MCP clients reach only list/create/update/delete of the token owner's wishlist | wishlist album data |
+| Credential at rest → DB, responses and logs | API keys and Discogs tokens exist only as ciphertext | secrets (high) |
+| User plugin event → fonoteka listener | Register input crosses a plugin boundary | registration payload |
+| Reservation data → wishlist owner | The giver's identity stays hidden until reveal | reserver identity |
+| Uploaded CSV → parser and private storage | Up to 5 MiB of untrusted bytes are decoded, parsed and kept unserved | file contents |
+| Album data → exported CSV | Cells are opened in spreadsheets | formula-shaped strings |
+| Shared collection → public serializer | Private album fields must not reach the anonymous response | album fields |
+| Gate script and fuzz corpus → tracked source and git | `--removal` edits tracked files temporarily; seeds are committed | source, synthetic inputs |
+
+---
+
+## Threat Register
+
+| Threat ID | Category | Component | Severity | Disposition | Mitigation | Status |
+|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------|------------|--------|
+| T-13-01 | Information Disclosure | token guessing / enumeration | high | mitigate | `classes/public_share.go` `PubfailCounter.Begin` (10 failures per address per 60 s), 16-symbol shape check, inline and per-token/per-IP buckets. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-01`, `TestPubfailCounter`; RC-08, RC-09 | closed |
+| T-13-02 | Information Disclosure | public serializer and facets | high | mitigate | `classes/serialize_public_album.go` `PublicAlbumDTO`, rating filter 422, collection re-gate. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-02`, `TestPublicAlbumFieldSet`; RC-20 | closed |
+| T-13-03 | Spoofing | disabled or regenerated share | high | mitigate | `classes/share_service.go` `ResolvePublic` requires `public_enabled = ?`, the route's kind and the current token. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-03`, `TestPublicResolve`; RC-06. Residual: see Audit Note (WR-04) | closed |
+| T-13-04 | Elevation of Privilege | reserve, cancel, reveal | high | mitigate | `classes/reservations.go` owner refused, cancel `WHERE album_id = ? AND user_id = ?`, reveal through own wishlist. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-04`, `TestReserveConcurrent`; RC-23 | closed |
+| T-13-05 | Information Disclosure | reservation mask in every serializer path | high | mitigate | `ReservationStateForViewer` masks the reserver for the owner before reveal. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-05`, `TestReservationMask`; RC-05 | closed |
+| T-13-06 | Information Disclosure / Tampering | peer wishlists, subscriptions, wishlist album ids | high | mitigate | `ReservableWishlistIDs`, `WishlistsVisibleTo`, `ActiveWishlist`; identical Winter 404 for foreign and missing. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-06`, `TestWishlistSubscriptions`; RC-24. Residual: see Audit Note (WR-04) | closed |
+| T-13-07 | Elevation of Privilege | token group | high | mitigate | `routes.go` mounts only wishlist CRUD and export on `/api/v1/fonoteka`, one `inv.scope` each. `TestRouteTablePhase13`, `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-07`; RC-22 | closed |
+| T-13-08 | Information Disclosure | credential responses, logs, marshal | high | mitigate | `lagoon.Encrypted` columns, `json:"-"` models, show selects provider/model/base_url only. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-08`, `TestCredentialSecretsNeverSerialized`; RC-21 | closed |
+| T-13-09 | Elevation of Privilege | org credential store/destroy, Discogs shared | high | mitigate | `controllers/api/credentials_controller.go` `mayManageOrg` → 403 or `shared_forbidden`, nothing written. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-09`, `TestCredentialsCRUD`; RC-25 | closed |
+| T-13-10 | Tampering | credential owner FK mass assignment | high | mitigate | `classes/credential_write_service.go` `CredentialFillFields`; owner keys from the session. `FuzzWriteEndpoints`, `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-10`; RC-15, RC-16 | closed |
+| T-13-11 | Tampering | base_url as SSRF target | medium | accept | Stored only (`nullable\|url`); Phase 14 owns the guarded outbound client (INTG-02). See Accepted Risks Log | closed |
+| T-13-12 | Elevation of Privilege | import routes by id | high | mitigate | `classes/csv_import_service.go` `CsvImportFor` (creator plus accessible collection). `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-12`, `TestCsvImportScope`; RC-13 | closed |
+| T-13-13 | Information Disclosure | CSV upload storage | high | mitigate | `controllers/api/csv_import_controller.go` `csvBucket(app)`: private bucket, server keys `fonoteka-csv/<uid>/<uuid>.csv`. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-13`, `TestCsvStoreAndShow`; RC-26 | closed |
+| T-13-14 | Tampering | exported cells | medium | mitigate | `classes/csv` `FormulaSafe` on every exported cell; mid-stream failure logged since 13-06. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-14`, `TestCsvExport`, `TestPHPFputcsv` | closed |
+| T-13-15 | Denial of Service | CSV parse | medium | mitigate | 5 MiB cap, `MaxRows` 5000, NUL rejection, `throttle:10,1`. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-15`, `TestPhase13Boundaries` | closed |
+| T-13-16 | Tampering | row edit Discogs pick | high | mitigate | Candidate allow-list; Phase 13 `ReleaseFetcher` returns `ErrDiscogsUnavailable`. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-16`, `TestCsvRowPickSeam`; RC-18 | closed |
+| T-13-17 | Tampering | double commit / double writer | high | mitigate | Commit compare-and-swap `WHERE id = ? AND status = ?`; since `ce4dd3a` (14-02, WR-02) mapping, row edits and cancel lock the import row (`clause.Locking{Strength: "UPDATE"}`) before writing. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-17`, `TestCsvCommitCAS`; RC-14 | closed |
+| T-13-18 | Elevation of Privilege | onboarding bootstrap | high | mitigate | `classes/onboarding.go` `BootstrapOwner`: 409 when a user exists, advisory lock plus recount, unique e-mail. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-18`, `TestBootstrapConcurrent`; RC-12 | closed |
+| T-13-19 | Spoofing | register listener invitation match | high | mitigate | `HandleRegisterEvent`: pending, unexpired, unrevoked, `LOWER(email) = ?`. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-19`, `TestRegisterInvitationListener`; RC-27 | closed |
+| T-13-20 | Information Disclosure | RegisterEvent.Payload | high | mitigate | sm-user-plugin `FireRegisterEvent` deletes `password` and `password_confirmation`. `TestRegisterEventPayload`, `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-20`; RC-10, RC-11 | closed |
+| T-13-21 | Information Disclosure / Tampering | notifications read and mark-read | medium | mitigate | `classes/notifications.go` `WHERE user_id = ? AND id = ?`; zero rows → Winter 404. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-21`, `TestNotificationsRoutes`; RC-17 | closed |
+| T-13-22 | Denial of Service / Repudiation | conga unregistered kinds | high | mitigate | `modules/conga` insert-only client for unregistered kinds, `ErrUnregisteredKindQueue` for served queues. `TestUnregisteredKindWithWorker`, `TestJobContractDispatchWhileWorkerRuns`; RC-04 | closed |
+| T-13-23 | Elevation of Privilege | surf overlap dispatch | high | mitigate | `modules/surf/overlap.go` `familyDispatch`: literals and constraints before dispatch, per-member chains, 404 on no match. `TestOverlappingConstrainedRoutes`, `TestOverlapConstraintFallsThrough`, `TestRouteTablePhase13`; RC-01 to RC-03 | closed |
+| T-13-24 | Repudiation | tide date and publication masks | medium | mitigate | Each mask checks the masked value's shape. `TestNormalizeContentDispositionDate`, `TestNormalizeNotificationPublication`, `TestNormalizePhase13Edges` | closed |
+| T-13-25 | Tampering | lagoon prohibited rule | medium | mitigate | Laravel 9 `prohibited` semantics. `TestValidateRequestProhibited`, `TestValidateRequestProhibitedNested`, `FuzzWriteEndpoints` | closed |
+| T-13-26 | Information Disclosure | php_parity.sh rows and share capture | medium | mitigate | `fonoteka.go/parity/php_parity.sh` `rows` runs `sqlite3 -readonly -safe`; share tokens captured as `{{share:wishlist}}`; `check_corpus --check-secrets` | closed |
+| T-13-27 | Information Disclosure | invitation inspection | medium | mitigate | `InspectInvitation` reveals the collection name only for a sha256-matched pending token; shared `throttle:10,1`. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-27`, `TestInspectInvitation` | closed |
+| T-13-28 | Tampering / Repudiation | item-added and purchase side effects | medium | mitigate | Bell rows, digest upsert (dispatch on insert only) and enqueues on the write transaction; publications after commit. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-28`, `TestDigestCoalescing`, `TestPurchaseMailAfterCommit`; RC-19 | closed |
+| T-13-29 | Information Disclosure | subscribe by token | medium | mitigate | `ResolvePublic` kind wishlist plus `subtle.ConstantTimeCompare` of the exact token. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-29`; RC-07 | closed |
+| T-13-30 | Information Disclosure | purchase mail job args and logs | medium | mitigate | `WishlistPurchasedMailArgs`: subscriber id and two names only; worker logs the id. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-30` | closed |
+| T-13-31 | Repudiation | queued jobs without workers | medium | mitigate | Unserved queues from the 13-01 contract; cancel stops summer_jobs and River rows. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-31`, `TestCsvJobRows`, `TestCsvCancel` | closed |
+| T-13-32 | Denial of Service | shared anonymous inline budget | low | accept | PHP parity: one `throttle:10,1` guest key across onboarding, inspection and public resolves. See Accepted Risks Log | closed |
+| T-13-33 | Elevation of Privilege | public route kind confusion | medium | mitigate | Every public handler passes its route's kind to `ResolvePublic`. `TestPhase13Threats/T-13-33`, `TestPublicResolve` | closed |
+| T-13-34 | Tampering | gate --removal leaving mutated source | medium | mitigate | `scripts/check-phase13.sh --removal`: dirty-file refusal, anchor-exact mutation, trap restore, `cmp` check; outside `--all`. `--self-test`; RC-31 | closed |
+| T-13-35 | Repudiation | security review claims without evidence | medium | mitigate | `scripts/check-phase13.sh` `evidence_check`. `--self-test`; RC-30 | closed |
+| T-13-36 | Information Disclosure | fuzz seed corpus | low | mitigate | Synthetic seeds; `corpus_scan` over `testdata/fuzz`. `--self-test`; RC-29 | closed |
+| T-13-SC | Tampering | package installs (`golang.org/x/text` v0.42.0) | medium | mitigate | Go-team module already in the graph, pinned by go.sum, approved at the plan-count checkpoint; no other plan adds a dependency. `check-phase13.sh --go`; RC-28 | closed |
+
+*Status: open · closed · open — below high threshold (non-blocking)*
+*Severity: critical > high > medium > low — only open threats at or above workflow.security_block_on count toward threats_open*
+*Disposition: mitigate (implementation required) · accept (documented risk) · transfer (third-party)*
+
+---
+
+## Accepted Risks Log
+
+| Risk ID | Threat Ref | Rationale | Accepted By | Date |
+|---------|------------|-----------|-------------|------|
+| AR-13-01 | T-13-11 | Phase 13 only stores `base_url`; no outbound call exists until Phase 14, which owns the guarded AI client (INTG-02, fetchguard) | 13-02 plan threat model | 2026-10-03 |
+| AR-13-02 | T-13-32 | PHP shares one `throttle:10,1` guest key across onboarding, inspection and public resolves; Go mirrors it (`inline:domainless\|ClientIP`) for parity, documented in `parity/README.md` | 13-05 plan threat model | 2026-10-03 |
+
+*Accepted risks do not resurface in future audit runs.*
+
+---
+
+## Audit Note (2026-10-12)
+
+The 13 findings of `13-REVIEW.md` are all still `open` in `13-REVIEW-DISPOSITION.md`. Two of them touch registered threats:
+
+- **WR-02 (T-13-17).** Mapping, row-edit and cancel writes bypassed the commit compare-and-swap, which could queue a second import job. The fix landed in Phase 14 (`fonoteka.go` `ce4dd3a`, "fix(14-02): mapping, row edits and cancel lock the CSV import before writing (WR-02)"). The tree now locks the row in `classes/csv_import_service.go`. T-13-17 is closed. The disposition row is stale and can be set to `fixed`.
+- **WR-04 (T-13-03, T-13-06).** A logged-in user who subscribed with a share token keeps peer read, reserve and notification access after the owner disables or regenerates the share. `ReservableWishlistIDs` does not check the share state. This matches PHP (`AlbumReservationService::reservableWishlistIds`), so it is not a porting defect. Both controls work as planned: anonymous public routes are revoked (T-13-03), and non-subscribers cannot reach the peer routes (T-13-06). The gap is recorded as a residual risk, not an open threat. Closing it would change PHP behaviour and needs a product decision note: either gate the subscription branch on `public_enabled` or add an owner-side "remove subscriber" route.
+
+The other review findings (WR-01, WR-03, IN-01 to IN-09) are about correctness, robustness and the gate. None of them removes a registered mitigation.
+
+The per-instance pubfail counter (T-13-01 residual in `13-SECURITY-REVIEW.md`) still applies: N instances allow N × 10 guesses per minute against a token of about 95 bits.
+
+---
+
+## Security Audit Trail
+
+| Audit Date | Threats Total | Closed | Open | Run By |
+|------------|---------------|--------|------|--------|
+| 2026-10-03 | 37 | 37 | 0 | 13-06 executor (`13-SECURITY-REVIEW.md`, removal checks RC-01 to RC-31) |
+| 2026-10-12 | 37 | 37 | 0 | /msd-secure-phase (ASVS L1: mitigation grep at HEAD plus re-run of `TestPhase13Threats` (27 subtests), `TestRouteTablePhase13`, `FuzzWriteEndpoints` and the surf/conga/tide/lagoon threat tests, all passing, no skips; short-circuit, no auditor) |
+
+---
+
+## Sign-Off
+
+- [x] All threats have a disposition (mitigate / accept / transfer)
+- [x] Accepted risks documented in Accepted Risks Log
+- [x] `threats_open: 0` confirmed
+- [x] `status: verified` set in frontmatter
+
+**Approval:** verified 2026-10-12