D-11: Issued access tokens retain the configured inv_ prefix.
path
provides
wristband/authorize.go
Ordered validation, redirects, PKCE, resource and scope policy
path
provides
wristband/token.go
Client authentication and atomic authorization-code exchange
from
to
via
pattern
wristband/token.go
oauth_token_issuer.go
single transaction-bound Tx
WithinTx
Implement the protocol core from authorize validation through one atomic authorization-code exchange.
Purpose: Prove PKCE, redirect, parser, scope, client-auth, and code-replay rules independently of the browser controller.
Output: Authorize/token handlers, issuer adapter, store transitions, and deterministic/concurrent tests.
@.planning/PROJECT.md
@.planning/ROADMAP.md
@.planning/STATE.md
@.planning/phases/08-oauth2-1-authorization-server/08-CONTEXT.md
@.planning/phases/08-oauth2-1-authorization-server/08-RESEARCH.md
@.planning/phases/08-oauth2-1-authorization-server/08-03-SUMMARY.md
Task 1: Specify authorize and code exchange with executable RED tests
wristband/authorize.go, wristband/token.go, wristband/authorize_test.go, wristband/token_test.go, ../fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/classes/auth/oauth_store.go, ../fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/classes/auth/oauth_token_issuer.go
- Unknown client/unregistered redirect are local 400 without Location; later errors use exact ordered RFC3986 redirects.
- S256 is mandatory; parser precedence, Basic override, cache headers, and exact challenge are tested.
- Tests compile and fail only through `PHASE8_RED:authorize-token`.
D-18: extend the existing interfaces with compiling authorize/token stubs and add deterministic unit plus real-store adapter tests. Use explicit `PHASE8_RED:authorize-token` assertions for absent behavior. Reject syntax/build/setup/missing-test failures through the shared RED verifier. Cover T-08-PKCE, CODE-REPLAY, OPEN-REDIRECT, SECRET-TIMING, SCOPE-CEILING, and REQUEST-LEAK, including synchronized concurrent code exchange.
scripts/check-phase8-red.sh authorize-token go test ./wristband -run 'Test(Authorize|Token|PKCE|Code)' -count=1
Named tests compile and execute, with the verifier accepting only the intended missing-behavior marker.
Task 2: Implement ordered authorize and atomic code exchange
wristband/authorize.go, wristband/token.go, wristband/authorize_test.go, wristband/token_test.go, ../fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/classes/auth/oauth_store.go, ../fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/classes/auth/oauth_token_issuer.go, ../fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/classes/auth/api_token_manager.go
- Validation order is usable client, exact redirect, response type, S256 method/challenge, scope ceiling, resource, pending creation.
- Code lock/consume, access-token mint/stamp, and refresh creation commit atomically once.
D-02: implement endpoint-specific parsing and reject JSON token calls before ParseForm. D-03: apply configured TTL/resource. D-04: compare fixed transforms with `subtle.ConstantTimeCompare`. D-05 and D-06: keep state/policy and exact raw responses in wristband. D-07: exchange under one app transaction/row lock. Build redirects from ordered pairs, never `url.Values.Encode`. D-11: make the app adapter prefix config-backed while retaining `inv_`. D-17: run expired-only sweep on token entry. Preserve exact `Basic realm="OAuth"`, no-store, and no-cache headers.
go test ./wristband -run 'Test(Authorize|Token|PKCE|Code)' -count=1 && cd ../fonoteka.go && go test ./plugins/golem15/fonoteka/classes/auth -run 'TestOAuth(Code|Issuer)' -count=1
One exact PKCE-bound code produces one inv_ access/refresh grant, and all validation/parser/replay failures are exact and tested.
<threat_model>
Trust Boundaries
Boundary
Description
Connector → authorize/token
Untrusted query/form/Basic input requests or redeems authority.
Tx → access-token store
One-time code state becomes durable credentials.
STRIDE Threat Register
Threat ID
Category
Component
Disposition
Mitigation Plan
T-08-PKCE
Spoofing/Elevation
authorize/token
mitigate
Mandatory S256 syntax and constant-time comparison.
T-08-CODE-REPLAY
Spoofing
exchange
mitigate
Row lock, single transaction, concurrent one-winner test.
T-08-OPEN-REDIRECT
Spoofing/Disclosure
authorize
mitigate
Exact redirect validation before any redirect.
T-08-SECRET-TIMING
Information Disclosure
client auth
mitigate
Fixed transforms and constant-time compare.
T-08-SCOPE-CEILING
Elevation
authorize
mitigate
Requested ∩ client ceiling before persistence.
T-08-SC
Tampering
dependencies
mitigate
Standard library and existing app services only.
</threat_model>
- Focused wristband and issuer/store tests pass.
- `go test -race ./wristband` passes at wave boundary.
<success_criteria>
Authorize and token protocol behavior is exact, concurrency-safe, and app-agnostic.
The configured personal-token issuer produces the unchanged inv_ wire format.
</success_criteria>
Create `.planning/phases/08-oauth2-1-authorization-server/08-04-SUMMARY.md` when done.
