summercms/.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-06-PLAN.md

---
phase: 06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting
plan: 06
type: execute
wave: 5
depends_on: ["06-05"]
files_modified:
  - fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes.go
  - fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes_isolation_test.go
  - .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-SECURITY-REVIEW.md
autonomous: true
gap_closure: true
requirements: [HTTP-04]

must_haves:
  truths:
    - "An unauthenticated request to GET /api/v1/fonoteka/genres passes through inv_token, then throttle:fonoteka-api-token, then inv.scope:read; InvScope can no longer short-circuit before the limiter consumes the request"
    - "The first 60 same-IP requests without credentials retain the PHP-compatible 401 Invalid token response, while request 61 returns HTTP 429 with exactly {\"message\":\"Too Many Attempts.\"}"
    - "A valid personal token is still resolved before the limiter, so the fonoteka-api-token bucket can retain its tok:<id> key instead of collapsing valid credentials onto the IP fallback"
    - "The phase security review covers Plan 06-06 and maps both newly identified rate-limit threats to the assembled-route regression and exact middleware-order invariant"
  artifacts:
    - path: "fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes.go"
      provides: "Correct live personal-token middleware declaration"
      contains: 'surf.Use("inv_token", "throttle:fonoteka-api-token", "inv.scope:read")'
    - path: "fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes_isolation_test.go"
      provides: "Assembled-route unauthenticated deny-path rate-limit regression"
      contains: "TestPersonalTokenGenresUnauthenticatedRequestsAreRateLimited"
    - path: ".planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-SECURITY-REVIEW.md"
      provides: "Final Phase 6 threat register and evidence map including Plan 06-06"
      contains: "T-06-21"
  key_links:
    - from: "fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes.go"
      to: "summercms.go/surf/router.go"
      via: "surf.Use declaration consumed by Router.wrap's last-to-first middleware composition"
      pattern: 'inv_token.*throttle:fonoteka-api-token.*inv\.scope:read'
    - from: "fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes_isolation_test.go"
      to: "/api/v1/fonoteka/genres"
      via: "surf.Assemble of the real golem15.user and golem15.fonoteka plugins followed by 61 same-IP requests"
      pattern: "surf\.Assemble|/api/v1/fonoteka/genres"
    - from: ".planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-SECURITY-REVIEW.md"
      to: "fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes_isolation_test.go"
      via: "T-06-21/T-06-22 proof entries naming the assembled-route regression and exact inv_token -> throttle -> inv.scope invariant"
      pattern: "T-06-2[12].*TestPersonalTokenGenresUnauthenticatedRequestsAreRateLimited|inv_token.*throttle:fonoteka-api-token.*inv\.scope:read"
---

<objective>
Close the HTTP-04 verification gap by correcting the live personal-token genres middleware onion and proving the unauthenticated deny path consumes the 60/minute bucket.

Purpose: remove the rate-limit bypass that currently allows unlimited missing/invalid personal-token requests to reach InvScope's 401 path without incrementing the limiter.
Output: the exact `inv_token` -> `throttle:fonoteka-api-token` -> `inv.scope:read` declaration, an isolated assembled-router regression proving request 61 is denied with the PHP-compatible 429 body, and a final security-review map for T-06-21/T-06-22.
</objective>

<execution_context>
@/home/jin/.codex/get-shit-done/workflows/execute-plan.md
@/home/jin/.codex/get-shit-done/templates/summary.md
</execution_context>

<context>
@.planning/PROJECT.md
@.planning/ROADMAP.md
@.planning/REQUIREMENTS.md
@.planning/STATE.md
@.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-CONTEXT.md
@.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-RESEARCH.md
@.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-VERIFICATION.md
@.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-REVIEW.md
@.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-SECURITY-REVIEW.md
@.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-02-SUMMARY.md
@.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-05-SUMMARY.md

<interfaces>
From `summercms.go/surf/router.go`:
- `Router.wrap` iterates `rt.middleware` from the last name to the first, so the first listed middleware becomes the outermost runtime wrapper.
- `Assemble(app, plugins) (http.Handler, error)` calls `BuildRouter`, which creates a new `FixedWindowLimiter` and `MemoryStore` for that assembled handler.

From `summercms.go/bouncer/registry.go`:
- A guard error without `UnauthorizedWriter` continues the chain without `bouncer.User` or `bouncer.Credential`, allowing `InvScope` to own the exact 401 body per D-08.

From `fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/plugin.go`:
- `fonoteka-api-token` uses `tok:<id>` when `bouncer.Credential` contains `*models.ApiToken`; otherwise it falls back to `surf.ClientIP` and enforces Max 60 over one minute.
</interfaces>
</context>

<tasks>

<task type="auto">
  <name>Task 1: Repair the personal-token middleware onion and prove the unauthenticated 61st request is throttled</name>
  <files>fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes.go, fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes_isolation_test.go</files>
  <read_first>
    fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes.go (the live `/api/v1/fonoteka` genres group and its current middleware declaration)
    fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes_isolation_test.go (real-plugin activation and BuildRouter isolation pattern)
    fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes_cors_test.go (`stubInvToken` and fresh assembled-router test setup patterns)
    fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/plugin.go (`fonoteka-api-token` Max/Decay/Key closure)
    fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/middleware/token_scope.go (InvScope 401/403 short-circuit behavior)
    summercms.go/surf/router.go (`Router.wrap` reverse loop and `Assemble`/`BuildRouter` fresh limiter construction)
    summercms.go/surf/limiter.go (`TooManyAttempts` before `Hit`, 60th-allowed/61st-denied semantics, exact 429 body)
    summercms.go/bouncer/registry.go (guard-error continuation and request-context behavior)
    .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-CONTEXT.md (D-01, D-02, D-05, D-06, D-08)
    .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-RESEARCH.md (Common Pitfall 5)
    .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-VERIFICATION.md (HTTP-04 failed truth and required target order)
    .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-REVIEW.md (CR-01)
  </read_first>
  <action>
    In `Plugin.Routes`, change only the live personal-token genres group's `surf.Use` arguments from `inv_token`, `inv.scope:read`, `throttle:fonoteka-api-token` to `inv_token`, `throttle:fonoteka-api-token`, `inv.scope:read`. This exact source order is required because `surf.Router.wrap` composes last-to-first: `inv_token` remains outermost and resolves a valid credential before the bucket key is computed (preserving `tok:<id>` per D-01/D-06), the throttle then consumes both authenticated and unauthenticated traffic (D-02), and `InvScope` remains the innermost scope/401/403 gate (D-08). Do not move throttle before `inv_token`, do not alter bucket limits or key logic, and do not address unrelated REVIEW.md warnings.

    In `routes_isolation_test.go`, add `TestPersonalTokenGenresUnauthenticatedRequestsAreRateLimited` using the existing real-plugin activation pattern: create a fresh `bootConfig` and `backpack.App`, publish a fresh `bouncer.Registry`, activate exactly `golem15.user` and `golem15.fonoteka`, and register a test-local `inv_token` guard that always returns unauthenticated without implementing `UnauthorizedWriter`. Assemble once with `surf.Assemble`; this construction must be local to the test and not shared or parallelized, so `BuildRouter` supplies a fresh `FixedWindowLimiter`/`MemoryStore` and no other test can consume its bucket.

    Send 61 independent `httptest.NewRequest` calls to `GET /api/v1/fonoteka/genres` through that assembled handler, with no Authorization header and the same explicit `RemoteAddr` on every request. Use a fresh recorder for every call. Assert requests 1 through 60 return 401 and, after `strings.TrimSpace`, the existing `{"error":"Invalid token"}` body, proving the throttle does not replace the normal deny response before exhaustion. Assert request 61 returns 429 and its raw body is exactly `{"message":"Too Many Attempts."}`, with `X-RateLimit-Limit: 60` and `X-RateLimit-Remaining: 0`. The test must exercise the production route, real middleware factory, real named bucket, and real limiter; do not hand-compose middleware or call `FixedWindowLimiter` directly.

    Search production route declarations under `fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka` for any other route containing both `inv.scope:` and `throttle:`. Apply this same order only if another live production route exists in the current tree; do not change test-only boot probes, empty future groups, or unrelated route stacks speculatively.
  </action>
  <verify>
    <automated>cd /media/nvme/dev/golem15/summercms.io/summercms/fonoteka.go && go test ./plugins/golem15/fonoteka -run 'TestPersonalTokenGenresUnauthenticatedRequestsAreRateLimited|TestFullRouteTableAuthGroupMutualExclusivity' -count=1 -short && go vet ./... && go test ./... -short</automated>
  </verify>
  <acceptance_criteria>
    - `routes.go` contains `surf.Use("inv_token", "throttle:fonoteka-api-token", "inv.scope:read")` on the live `/api/v1/fonoteka/genres` group and does not contain the old `inv_token`, `inv.scope:read`, `throttle:fonoteka-api-token` order.
    - `TestPersonalTokenGenresUnauthenticatedRequestsAreRateLimited` calls the handler returned by `surf.Assemble` for the real two-plugin set; it does not construct a limiter or middleware chain directly.
    - The test uses one fresh assembled handler and a stable explicit RemoteAddr for all 61 requests, with no `t.Parallel`, global handler, or shared limiter state.
    - Requests 1-60 assert HTTP 401 plus trimmed body `{"error":"Invalid token"}`; request 61 asserts HTTP 429 plus raw body exactly `{"message":"Too Many Attempts."}`, `X-RateLimit-Limit: 60`, and `X-RateLimit-Remaining: 0`.
    - The targeted command exits 0 under `-short`, proving the regression does not require Docker, Postgres, or shared test state.
    - From the `fonoteka.go` repository root, `go vet ./...` and `go test ./... -short` both exit 0 before the plan can proceed to the security-review update or summary.
  </acceptance_criteria>
  <done>The live personal-token genres route consumes unauthenticated requests in the 60/minute bucket before InvScope short-circuits, while valid tokens remain resolvable to tok:<id>; an assembled-route regression fails if the middleware order is inverted again.</done>
</task>

<task type="auto">
  <name>Task 2: Extend the Phase 6 security review through the gap closure</name>
  <files>.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-SECURITY-REVIEW.md</files>
  <read_first>
    .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-SECURITY-REVIEW.md (existing verified scope, threat-register format, findings structure, accepted-risk count, and audit trail)
    .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-06-PLAN.md (T-06-21/T-06-22 mitigations and Task 1 evidence contract)
    .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-VERIFICATION.md (failed HTTP-04 truth and required middleware order)
    .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-REVIEW.md (CR-01 rate-limit bypass and valid-token keying constraint)
    fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes.go (executed exact middleware declaration)
    fonoteka.go/plugins/golem15/fonoteka/routes_isolation_test.go (executed assembled-route 61-request regression)
  </read_first>
  <action>
    After Task 1's code, regression, `go vet ./...`, and repository-wide `go test ./... -short` evidence are green, update `06-SECURITY-REVIEW.md` as the final documentation execution step. Extend the review header, introductory coverage statement, and Scope from Plans 06-01 through 06-05 to include gap-closure Plan 06-06. Preserve every existing threat, disposition, proof, accepted-risk rationale, and audit entry.

    Add T-06-21 to the Threat Register as the unauthenticated personal-token rate-limit bypass mitigation. Its proof must name `TestPersonalTokenGenresUnauthenticatedRequestsAreRateLimited`, state that it drives 61 same-IP requests through the real handler returned by `surf.Assemble`, and record that requests 1-60 keep the 401 Invalid token response while request 61 receives the exact 429 response. Record the exact runtime-order invariant as source declaration `inv_token` -> `throttle:fonoteka-api-token` -> `inv.scope:read`; do not summarize it as merely "middleware reordered."

    Add T-06-22 to the Threat Register as the valid-credential bucket-isolation mitigation. Its proof must state that `inv_token` remains before `throttle:fonoteka-api-token`, so `bouncer.Credential` is populated before the bucket key closure and valid credentials retain `tok:<id>` keying rather than collapsing onto the IP fallback. Add corresponding Findings by Threat prose for T-06-21/T-06-22 that cites the executed route and regression evidence. Update the closed-threat total and Security Audit Trail to reflect all 21 reviewed IDs (`T-06-01` through `T-06-18`, `T-06-21`, `T-06-22`, and `T-06-SC`) with zero open; do not create new accepted risks because both new threats are mitigated. Keep this documentation-only update in Task 2's separate atomic commit after Task 1's implementation-and-test commit.
  </action>
  <verify>
    <automated>cd /media/nvme/dev/golem15/summercms.io/summercms/summercms.go && test "$(awk -F'|' '/^\| T-06-(21|22) / {c++} END {print c+0}' .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-SECURITY-REVIEW.md)" -eq 2 && rg -n 'Plans 06-01 through 06-06|Plan 06-06' .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-SECURITY-REVIEW.md && rg -n 'TestPersonalTokenGenresUnauthenticatedRequestsAreRateLimited|61 same-IP' .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-SECURITY-REVIEW.md && rg -n 'inv_token.*throttle:fonoteka-api-token.*inv\.scope:read' .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-SECURITY-REVIEW.md && rg -n 'T-06-22' .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-SECURITY-REVIEW.md && rg -n 'tok:&lt;id&gt;|tok:<id>' .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-SECURITY-REVIEW.md && rg -n '\| [0-9]{4}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2} \| 21 \| 21 \| 0 \|' .planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-SECURITY-REVIEW.md</automated>
  </verify>
  <acceptance_criteria>
    - The review Scope explicitly includes Plan 06-06, and its coverage statement includes T-06-21 and T-06-22 in addition to all previously reviewed threat IDs.
    - T-06-21 is a mitigate row whose proof links the exact `inv_token` -> `throttle:fonoteka-api-token` -> `inv.scope:read` invariant to the real assembled-route 61-request regression and its 401-through-60/429-on-61 behavior.
    - T-06-22 is a mitigate row whose proof states that `inv_token` remains before throttle so valid credentials preserve `tok:<id>` keying.
    - Findings by Threat contains concrete evidence sections for both new threats; the review does not rely only on register-row prose.
    - The status remains closed/verified with 21 total threats, 21 closed, zero open, and no new accepted risk.
  </acceptance_criteria>
  <done>The final Phase 6 security review covers Plan 06-06 and makes both the deny-path limiter regression and valid-token key-isolation invariant auditable under T-06-21/T-06-22.</done>
</task>

</tasks>

<threat_model>
## Trust Boundaries

| Boundary | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| unauthenticated client -> personal-token route | Missing or invalid bearer traffic is attacker-controlled and must consume a bounded per-IP budget before credential/scope denial returns |
| inv_token context -> limiter key resolver | Valid credentials must be available before rate limiting so users receive independent tok:<id> budgets; unauthenticated traffic must safely fall back to ClientIP |

## STRIDE Threat Register

| Threat ID | Category | Component | Disposition | Mitigation Plan |
|-----------|----------|-----------|-------------|-----------------|
| T-06-21 | Denial of Service | `/api/v1/fonoteka/genres` middleware chain | mitigate | Put `throttle:fonoteka-api-token` between `inv_token` and `inv.scope:read`; the assembled-route 61-request regression proves missing credentials cannot bypass the 60/minute deny-path budget |
| T-06-22 | Denial of Service | `fonoteka-api-token` key selection | mitigate | Keep `inv_token` outermost so valid credentials populate `bouncer.Credential` before the bucket key closure runs and retain per-token `tok:<id>` isolation rather than sharing an IP bucket |
| T-06-SC | Tampering | package supply chain | accept | This gap closure performs no npm, pip, cargo, or Go module install and changes no dependency manifest; it uses only already-audited Phase 6 code |
</threat_model>

<source_coverage_audit>
| Source | ID | Coverage | Status |
|--------|----|----------|--------|
| GOAL | Phase 6 success criterion 2 | Plans 06-01 through 06-05 provide the limiter/buckets; Task 1 repairs the failed live deny path and Task 2 records its final security evidence | COVERED |
| REQ | HTTP-04 | Task 1 makes the live named bucket enforceable on unauthenticated traffic and adds regression proof; Task 2 maps the closed threats | COVERED |
| REQ | HTTP-03, HTTP-05, HTTP-06, HTTP-07, HTTP-08, HTTP-09 | Already satisfied by executed Plans 06-01 through 06-05; no verification gap requests further work | COVERED (existing) |
| RESEARCH | Common Pitfall 5 | Exact inv_token -> throttle -> InvScope order plus no-double-lookup assembled behavior in Task 1, with T-06-21/T-06-22 evidence recorded by Task 2 | COVERED |
| CONTEXT | D-01, D-02, D-05, D-06, D-08 | Exact named bucket, 429 body, parameterized middleware, credential context, and InvScope ownership preserved in Task 1 and audited in Task 2 | COVERED |
| CONTEXT | D-03, D-04, D-07, D-09 through D-18 | Already implemented by executed Plans 06-01 through 06-05 and not reopened by the authoritative gap | COVERED (existing) |
| CONTEXT | Deferred Ideas | Explicitly excluded from this gap plan | EXCLUDED |
</source_coverage_audit>

<verification>
From `/media/nvme/dev/golem15/summercms.io/summercms/fonoteka.go`, run `go test ./plugins/golem15/fonoteka -run 'TestPersonalTokenGenresUnauthenticatedRequestsAreRateLimited|TestFullRouteTableAuthGroupMutualExclusivity' -count=1 -short`, then the commit-level gates `go vet ./...` and `go test ./... -short`. Confirm a source grep shows only the target live order for the personal-token genres route. Before commit and summary, verify `06-SECURITY-REVIEW.md` includes Plan 06-06, T-06-21/T-06-22, the named assembled-route test, the exact middleware invariant, valid-token `tok:<id>` preservation, and an audit-trail total of 21 closed / 0 open.
</verification>

<success_criteria>
- The live personal-token genres group declares `inv_token`, `throttle:fonoteka-api-token`, `inv.scope:read` in that exact order.
- A fresh assembled-router test proves requests 1-60 without credentials return the existing 401 body and request 61 from the same IP returns the exact PHP-compatible 429 body and exhausted-limit headers.
- The regression runs under `-short` with no database or external service and cannot inherit limiter counters from another test.
- `go vet ./...` and repository-wide `go test ./... -short` pass from the `fonoteka.go` repository root before commit/summary.
- `06-SECURITY-REVIEW.md` covers Plan 06-06 and closes T-06-21/T-06-22 with concrete links to the assembled-route regression, exact middleware order, and preserved `tok:<id>` keying.
- HTTP-04's verification blocker and REVIEW CR-01 are directly closed without changing unrelated warnings or deferred work.
</success_criteria>

<output>
Create `.planning/phases/06-http-routing-auth-groups-and-rate-limiting/06-06-SUMMARY.md` when done.
</output>