fix: sanitize journal HTML instead of blanking it on a regex match

The three-regex gate could be bypassed (an attribute without a space, <svg/onload>, entity-encoded or tab-split javascript: URLs, MathML xlink:href, base, meta refresh, forms) and it blanked a whole post or category when ordinary text such as "Data: 12 maja 2024" matched. - sanitizeJournalHtml runs sanitize-html with the Journal plugin's bluemonday policy: UGC elements plus footer, class, schema.org microdata, four validated inline styles, footnote roles, dir=auto, two chat transcript data attributes; http, https, mailto and relative URLs only - gateJournalHtml and isSafeJournalHtml keep their signatures; html is always the sanitized value and is never blanked - post body, category content and both page payloads are sanitized; the blocked notice, its style and string, and the blocked props and content_blocked field are removed - toPostView moves to postView.ts so list pages and cards do not load the sanitizer - tests cover every bypass from the review, the Data:/metadata: text and an imported author footer; the SSR smoke expects the unsafe sample's safe paragraphs
2026-10-10 00:01:01 +02:00
parent 3275a267f6
commit 5beb1c5634
13 changed files with 487 additions and 112 deletions
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Route paths are configuration, not files. The layer's page components live in `a
 - **Tag** (`journal-tag`) and **author** (`journal-author`) pages. An author resolves by author slug, or by login once the author has a published post; a login URL sets the canonical to the slug URL.
 - **RSS**: `/rss.xml` proxies the API feed, and list and post pages link it in the head.
 - **SEO**: per-page title and description, Open Graph tags (`og:image` from the featured image, article times), canonical URLs that keep `?page=N`, robots and `sitemap.xml` through `@nuxtjs/seo`.
- **HTML gate**: post bodies and category content pass the Journal API's three-pattern gate (raw script, iframe, object or embed tags; event-handler attributes; javascript, vbscript or data URLs) before `v-html`. A value that fails it renders a neutral notice and never reaches the page or the SSR payload.
+- **HTML sanitizer**: post bodies and category content go through `sanitizeJournalHtml` before `v-html` and before they reach the SSR payload. It is [sanitize-html](https://github.com/apostrophecms/sanitize-html) with the Journal API's own allow-list: the usual content elements, `footer`, `class`, schema.org microdata, the `color`, `font-size`, `font-weight` and `text-align` inline styles, and `http`, `https`, `mailto` or relative URLs. Anything else (`script`, `style`, `iframe`, `svg`, forms, event-handler attributes, `javascript:` URLs in any spelling) is removed and the rest of the value is kept, so a post never renders blank because of one stray tag. Server and browser produce the same string, so hydration matches. See `docs/decisions/0001-sanitize-html.md`.
 - **i18n**: English and Polish UI strings, registered only for the locales the app enables.

 ## Usage
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ export default defineNuxtConfig({
 })
 ```

-The layer declares `@nuxt/fonts`, `@nuxtjs/i18n` and `@nuxtjs/seo` itself. Do not list them again in the app; if the app must, pin the same exact versions. Static app pages such as `/about` take precedence over a `/:category` route.
+The layer declares `@nuxt/fonts`, `@nuxtjs/i18n`, `@nuxtjs/seo` and `sanitize-html` itself. Do not list them again in the app; if the app must, pin the same exact versions. Static app pages such as `/about` take precedence over a `/:category` route.

 Run the built app with `node .output/server/index.mjs` next to the SummerCMS application and point `NUXT_JOURNAL_API_BASE` at it.

@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Override tokens in the app's CSS. The app's `css` entries load after the layer's
 }
 ```

-Override a component by creating the same file in the app, for example `app/components/Journal/PostCard.vue`. The overridable components are `JournalPostBody`, `JournalPostCard`, `JournalPostList`, `JournalPostMeta`, `JournalFeaturedImage`, `JournalPagination`, `JournalRelatedPosts`, `JournalIndexHeader`, `JournalCategoryHeader`, `JournalAuthorCard` and `JournalRssLink`. A replacement that renders HTML from the API must keep the gate (`gateJournalHtml`) in front of `v-html`.
+Override a component by creating the same file in the app, for example `app/components/Journal/PostCard.vue`. The overridable components are `JournalPostBody`, `JournalPostCard`, `JournalPostList`, `JournalPostMeta`, `JournalFeaturedImage`, `JournalPagination`, `JournalRelatedPosts`, `JournalIndexHeader`, `JournalCategoryHeader`, `JournalAuthorCard` and `JournalRssLink`. A replacement that renders HTML from the API must pass it through `sanitizeJournalHtml` (or `gateJournalHtml`, whose `html` is the same sanitized string) before `v-html`. Style classes that imported content uses, such as an author footer, belong in the app's CSS scoped under `.journal-post-body`: the sanitizer removes `<style>` elements from the content.

 Pages and components can use the `useJournalApi()` client and the `useJournalLinks()` link helpers (`postLink`, `categoryLink`, `tagLink`, `authorLink`, `indexLink`), which return `null` for a disabled view.

@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ A release is an annotated git tag (`v0.1.0`) on `main`, pushed to git.golem15.co

 ## Testing

- `pnpm test` runs the unit tests in `tests/*.test.ts` with `node --test` (Node strips the TypeScript types; no test framework dependency). They cover the pure helpers in `app/utils/`: route normalization and path filling, the client against a fake fetcher, pagination, the HTML gate (the Journal plugin's FormatHTML cases), sitemap entries, SEO values, and pl/en key and placeholder parity. They need no build, network or database.
+- `pnpm test` runs the unit tests in `tests/*.test.ts` with `node --test` (Node strips the TypeScript types; no test framework dependency). They cover the pure helpers in `app/utils/`: route normalization and path filling, the client against a fake fetcher, pagination, the HTML sanitizer (the Journal plugin's FormatHTML cases and the bypasses from its code review), the post page view, sitemap entries, SEO values, and pl/en key and placeholder parity. They need no build, network or database.
 - `scripts/check-git-install.sh <tag>` installs the layer from the git tag into a scratch app, checks that `pnpm-lock.yaml` pins the tag's commit, runs `nuxt build`, and runs the SSR smoke against the build. Run it from a directory that is not inside a directory named `vue-journal-layer` (Nuxt treats such a path segment as the layer).
 - `testing/smoke-ssr.mjs --output <.output> --fixtures <dir> --expect <file>` boots a fixture Journal API and the built server and checks each line of the expectations file (`STATUS PATH [contains=TEXT] [notcontains=TEXT] [type=PREFIX]`). It also checks that SSR requests forwarded `x-forwarded-for` and that categories were requested with `include_empty=1`.
 - `testing/fixture-api.mjs` (`startFixtureApi`) serves the anonymous Journal routes from JSON fixtures in `testing/fixtures/acme/`; `testing/nuxt-server.mjs` (`startNuxtServer`) starts a built server. Apps can import both from `node_modules/vue-journal-layer/testing/`.
--- a/app/assets/css/journal-base.css
+++ b/app/assets/css/journal-base.css
@@ -170,13 +170,6 @@
  text-align: left;
 }

-.journal-post-body--blocked {
-  padding: var(--journal-space-3);
-  border: 1px dashed var(--journal-color-border);
-  border-radius: var(--journal-radius-md);
-  color: var(--journal-color-muted);
-}
-
 /* Listings */
 .journal-post-list {
  display: grid;
--- a/app/components/Journal/CategoryHeader.vue
+++ b/app/components/Journal/CategoryHeader.vue
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 <script setup lang="ts">
 // Heading of a category page: name, description and the category's rich
-// content, which passes the Journal HTML gate before v-html.
+// content, which goes through the Journal sanitizer before v-html.
 import type { JournalCategory } from '../../utils/types.ts'
-import { gateJournalHtml } from '../../utils/htmlGate.ts'
+import { sanitizeJournalHtml } from '../../utils/htmlGate.ts'

-const props = defineProps<{ category: JournalCategory; page?: number; blocked?: boolean }>()
-const content = computed(() => (props.blocked ? { safe: false, html: '' } : gateJournalHtml(props.category.content)))
+const props = defineProps<{ category: JournalCategory; page?: number }>()
+const content = computed(() => sanitizeJournalHtml(props.category.content))
 </script>

 <template>
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ const content = computed(() => (props.blocked ? { safe: false, html: '' } : gate
      {{ category.name }}<template v-if="page && page > 1"> · {{ $t('journal.pagination.pageTitle', { page }) }}</template>
    </h1>
    <p v-if="category.description" class="journal-category-header__description">{{ category.description }}</p>
-    <div v-if="content.safe && content.html" class="journal-category-header__content journal-post-body" v-html="content.html" />
-    <p v-else-if="!content.safe" class="journal-post-body--blocked">{{ $t('journal.post.contentUnavailable') }}</p>
+    <div v-if="content" class="journal-category-header__content journal-post-body" v-html="content" />
  </header>
 </template>
--- a/app/components/Journal/PostBody.vue
+++ b/app/components/Journal/PostBody.vue
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
 <script setup lang="ts">
-// The post body. v-html only ever receives HTML that passed the Journal gate;
-// a blocked or unsafe body renders a neutral notice instead.
-import { gateJournalHtml } from '../../utils/htmlGate.ts'
+// The post body. v-html only ever receives HTML that went through the Journal
+// sanitizer, which removes what the policy does not allow and keeps the rest.
+// The page passes an already sanitized body; sanitizing again here guards a
+// caller that does not, and gives the same string on server and client.
+import { sanitizeJournalHtml } from '../../utils/htmlGate.ts'

-const props = defineProps<{ html: string | null | undefined; blocked?: boolean }>()
-const gated = computed(() => (props.blocked ? { safe: false, html: '' } : gateJournalHtml(props.html)))
+const props = defineProps<{ html: string | null | undefined }>()
+const html = computed(() => sanitizeJournalHtml(props.html))
 </script>

 <template>
-  <div v-if="gated.safe" class="journal-post-body" v-html="gated.html" />
-  <p v-else class="journal-post-body journal-post-body--blocked">{{ $t('journal.post.contentUnavailable') }}</p>
+  <div class="journal-post-body" v-html="html" />
 </template>
--- a/app/journal-pages/CategoryPage.vue
+++ b/app/journal-pages/CategoryPage.vue
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 // The slug resolves against GET /categories?include_empty=1, so an empty
 // category answers 200 with its content; an unknown slug is a real 404 (this
 // route may be a root-level catch-all in the app).
-import { gateJournalHtml } from '../utils/htmlGate.ts'
+import { sanitizeJournalHtml } from '../utils/htmlGate.ts'
 import { pageOutOfRange, parsePageParam } from '../utils/pagination.ts'
 import { listTitle } from '../utils/seo.ts'
 import { toListPost } from '../utils/view.ts'
@@ -24,12 +24,10 @@ const { data, error } = await useAsyncData(`journal-category-${slug}-${page}`, a
  const found = await api.findCategory(slug)
  if (!found) return null
  const posts = await api.listPosts({ category: found.slug, page, perPage: cfg.perPage.category, sort: cfg.sort })
-  // Only this category reaches the payload, with its content already gated.
-  const gated = gateJournalHtml(found.content)
+  // Only this category reaches the payload, with its content already sanitized.
  const { children: _children, ...category } = found
  return {
-    category: { ...category, content: gated.html || null },
-    contentBlocked: !gated.safe,
+    category: { ...category, content: sanitizeJournalHtml(found.content) || null },
    posts: { ...posts, data: posts.data.map(toListPost) },
  }
 })
@@ -48,7 +46,7 @@ useSeoMeta({ title, ogTitle: title, description, ogDescription: description })

 <template>
  <section v-if="data" class="journal-category">
-    <JournalCategoryHeader :category="data.category" :page="page" :blocked="data.contentBlocked" />
+    <JournalCategoryHeader :category="data.category" :page="page" />
    <JournalPostList :posts="data.posts.data" :empty="$t('journal.category.empty')" />
    <JournalPagination :current="data.posts.meta.current_page" :last="data.posts.meta.last_page" />
  </section>
--- a/app/journal-pages/PostPage.vue
+++ b/app/journal-pages/PostPage.vue
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
 <script setup lang="ts">
 // journal-post: one published post by slug. An unknown, draft or future post
-// is a real 404. The transform gates the body before it reaches the payload.
+// is a real 404. The transform sanitizes the body before it reaches the payload.
 // Related posts fall back to the latest posts when the API has none (it
 // returns none for a post without a category).
 import { postSeoMeta } from '../utils/seo.ts'
-import { toListPost, toPostView } from '../utils/view.ts'
+import { toPostView } from '../utils/postView.ts'
+import { toListPost } from '../utils/view.ts'
 import type { JournalModuleOptions } from '../utils/types.ts'

 const route = useRoute()
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ useSeoMeta(postSeoMeta(post.value, useSiteConfig().url || useRequestURL().origin
      <JournalPostMeta :post="post" />
    </header>
    <JournalFeaturedImage :src="post.featured_image_url" :alt="post.title" eager />
-    <JournalPostBody :html="post.content_html" :blocked="post.content_blocked" />
+    <JournalPostBody :html="post.content_html" />
    <nav v-if="post.previous_post || post.next_post" class="journal-post__siblings">
      <NuxtLink
        v-if="post.previous_post && links.postLink(post.previous_post.slug)"
--- a/app/utils/htmlGate.ts
+++ b/app/utils/htmlGate.ts
@@ -1,23 +1,257 @@
-// HTML gate for every v-html sink (post body, category content, author bio).
-// The three patterns are the verbatim regex sources of the Journal plugin's
-// FormatHTML / CheckHTML gate (classes/format_html.go), with the i flag for
-// Go's (?i). Imported content bypasses the Go gate, so the layer checks again.
+// HTML sanitizer for every v-html sink (post body, category content, and
+// any HTML copy an app renders the same way). It mirrors the Journal
+// plugin's bluemonday policy (classes/format_html.go): the UGC element and
+// attribute set, plus footer, class, schema.org microdata, a few validated
+// inline styles, goldmark's footnote roles, dir="auto" and two chat
+// transcript data attributes. URLs must be http, https, mailto or relative.
+//
+// The Journal API already sanitizes what FormatHTML writes. This is defence
+// in depth for rows written another way (direct SQL, legacy imports) and for
+// the API itself: anything outside the policy is stripped, never the whole
+// value, so legitimate text such as "Data: 12 maja 2024" always renders.
+//
+// sanitize-html runs the same parser and serializer on the server (SSR) and
+// in the browser, so a body sanitizes to the same string on both and
+// hydration never sees a difference. The output is always the serializer's,
+// never the input bytes: the browser parses exactly what the policy checked.
+// See docs/decisions/0001-sanitize-html.md.

-export const UNSAFE_TAG = /<(?:script|iframe|object|embed)\b/i
-export const EVENT_HANDLER = /\son[a-z]+\s*=/i
-export const DANGEROUS_URL = /(?:javascript|vbscript|data):/i
+import sanitizeHtml from 'sanitize-html'

-/** True when `html` matches none of the three Journal patterns. */
-export function isSafeJournalHtml(html: string | null | undefined): boolean {
-  if (!html) return true
-  return !(UNSAFE_TAG.test(html) || EVENT_HANDLER.test(html) || DANGEROUS_URL.test(html))
+/** Elements of bluemonday's UGC policy, plus footer. */
+export const JOURNAL_ALLOWED_TAGS: readonly string[] = [
+  // Sectioning, headings, grouping
+  'article', 'aside', 'details', 'figure', 'section', 'summary', 'footer',
+  'h1', 'h2', 'h3', 'h4', 'h5', 'h6', 'hgroup',
+  'blockquote', 'br', 'div', 'hr', 'p', 'span', 'wbr',
+  // Links and image maps
+  'a', 'map', 'area',
+  // Phrasing
+  'abbr', 'acronym', 'cite', 'code', 'dfn', 'em', 'figcaption', 'mark', 's', 'samp',
+  'strong', 'sub', 'sup', 'var', 'q', 'time',
+  'b', 'i', 'pre', 'small', 'strike', 'tt', 'u',
+  'bdi', 'bdo', 'rp', 'rt', 'ruby', 'del', 'ins',
+  // Lists and tables
+  'ol', 'ul', 'li', 'dl', 'dt', 'dd',
+  'table', 'caption', 'col', 'colgroup', 'thead', 'tbody', 'tfoot', 'tr', 'td', 'th',
+  // Data display and images
+  'meter', 'progress', 'img',
+]
+
+/** URL schemes an href, src or cite may use; relative URLs are allowed too. */
+export const JOURNAL_ALLOWED_SCHEMES: readonly string[] = ['http', 'https', 'mailto']
+
+// bluemonday's value patterns (helpers.go), as JavaScript regexes. Several
+// are unanchored in bluemonday (lang, id, scope, nowrap) and stay unanchored
+// here, so the layer never strips what the API keeps.
+const PARAGRAPH = /^[\p{L}\p{N}\s\-_',[\]!./\\()]*$/u
+const SPACE_SEPARATED_TOKENS = /^[\s\p{L}\p{N}_-]+$/u
+const INTEGER = /^[0-9]+$/
+const NUMBER = /^[-+]?[0-9]*\.?[0-9]+([eE][-+]?[0-9]+)?$/
+const NUMBER_OR_PERCENT = /^[0-9]+%?$/
+const LIST_TYPE = /^(circle|disc|square|a|A|i|I|1)$/i
+const CELL_ALIGN = /^(center|justify|left|right|char)$/i
+const CELL_VERTICAL_ALIGN = /^(baseline|bottom|middle|top)$/i
+const IMAGE_ALIGN = /^(left|right|top|texttop|middle|absmiddle|baseline|bottom|absbottom)$/i
+const ISO8601 = /^[0-9]{4}(-[0-9]{2}(-[0-9]{2}([ T][0-9]{2}(:[0-9]{2}){1,2}(.[0-9]{1,6})?Z?([+-][0-9]{2}:[0-9]{2})?)?)?)?$/
+const FOOTNOTE_ROLE = /^doc-(noteref|endnotes|backlink)$/
+
+// A value pattern; null marks a URL attribute (checked by allowedUrl) or
+// style (filtered per property by allowedStyles).
+type ValueRule = RegExp | null
+
+// Attributes allowed on every element.
+const GLOBAL_ATTRS: Record<string, ValueRule> = {
+  dir: /^(ltr|rtl|auto)$/i,
+  lang: /[a-zA-Z]{2,20}/,
+  id: /[a-zA-Z0-9:\-_.]+/,
+  title: PARAGRAPH,
+  class: SPACE_SEPARATED_TOKENS,
+  itemscope: /^(|itemscope)$/,
+  itemtype: /^https?:\/\/schema\.org\/[A-Za-z]+$/,
+  itemprop: SPACE_SEPARATED_TOKENS,
+  style: null,
+}
+
+const ALIGN_VALIGN: Record<string, ValueRule> = { align: CELL_ALIGN, valign: CELL_VERTICAL_ALIGN }
+const SIZE: Record<string, ValueRule> = { height: NUMBER_OR_PERCENT, width: NUMBER_OR_PERCENT }
+const CELL: Record<string, ValueRule> = {
+  ...ALIGN_VALIGN,
+  ...SIZE,
+  abbr: PARAGRAPH,
+  colspan: INTEGER,
+  rowspan: INTEGER,
+  headers: SPACE_SEPARATED_TOKENS,
+  scope: /(?:row|col)(?:group)?/i,
+  nowrap: /|nowrap/i,
+}
+
+// Attributes allowed on one element, on top of GLOBAL_ATTRS.
+const ELEMENT_ATTRS: Record<string, Record<string, ValueRule>> = {
+  details: { open: /^(|open)$/i },
+  blockquote: { cite: null },
+  q: { cite: null },
+  a: { href: null, role: FOOTNOTE_ROLE },
+  div: {
+    role: FOOTNOTE_ROLE,
+    'data-message-author-role': /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/,
+    'data-message-id': /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/,
+  },
+  map: { name: /^[\p{L}\p{N}_-]+$/u },
+  area: {
+    alt: PARAGRAPH,
+    coords: /^([0-9]+,)+[0-9]+$/,
+    href: null,
+    rel: SPACE_SEPARATED_TOKENS,
+    shape: /^(default|circle|rect|poly)$/i,
+  },
+  img: { src: null, alt: PARAGRAPH, align: IMAGE_ALIGN, ...SIZE, usemap: /^#[\p{L}\p{N}_-]+$/iu },
+  time: { datetime: ISO8601 },
+  del: { cite: PARAGRAPH, datetime: ISO8601 },
+  ins: { cite: PARAGRAPH, datetime: ISO8601 },
+  ol: { type: LIST_TYPE },
+  ul: { type: LIST_TYPE },
+  li: { type: LIST_TYPE, value: INTEGER },
+  table: { ...SIZE, summary: PARAGRAPH },
+  col: { ...ALIGN_VALIGN, ...SIZE, span: INTEGER },
+  colgroup: { ...ALIGN_VALIGN, ...SIZE, span: INTEGER },
+  thead: ALIGN_VALIGN,
+  tbody: ALIGN_VALIGN,
+  tfoot: ALIGN_VALIGN,
+  tr: ALIGN_VALIGN,
+  td: CELL,
+  th: CELL,
+  meter: { value: NUMBER, min: NUMBER, max: NUMBER, low: NUMBER, high: NUMBER, optimum: NUMBER },
+  progress: { value: NUMBER, max: NUMBER },
+}
+
+// Inline styles: bluemonday's css handlers for the four allowed properties.
+// A named colour is letters only, so it cannot carry url() or expression().
+const CSS_LENGTH = /^-?([0-9]+|[0-9]*\.[0-9]+)(%|cm|mm|in|px|pt|pc|em|ex|ch|rem|vw|vh|vmin|vmax|deg|rad|turn)?$/
+const RGB_PART = '(([0-9]{1,2}|100)%|([01]?[0-9]{1,2}|2[0-4][0-9]|25[0-5]))'
+const ALLOWED_STYLES: Record<string, RegExp[]> = {
+  color: [
+    /^[a-z]+$/i,
+    /^#([0-9a-f]{3,4}|[0-9a-f]{6}|[0-9a-f]{8})$/i,
+    new RegExp(`^rgb\\(( *${RGB_PART},){2} *${RGB_PART}\\)$`),
+    new RegExp(`^rgba\\(( *${RGB_PART},){3} *(1(\\.0)?|0|0\\.[0-9]+)\\)$`),
+    /^hsl\( *([012]?[0-9]{1,2}|3[0-5][0-9]|360), *([0-9]{0,2}|100)%, *([0-9]{0,2}|100)%\)$/,
+    /^hsla\( *([012]?[0-9]{1,2}|3[0-5][0-9]|360), *([0-9]{0,2}|100)%, *([0-9]{0,2}|100)%, *(1|1\.0|0|0\.[0-9]+)\)$/,
+  ],
+  'font-size': [CSS_LENGTH, /^(medium|xx-small|x-small|small|large|x-large|xx-large|smaller|larger|initial|inherit)$/i],
+  'font-weight': [/^(normal|bold|bolder|lighter|[1-9]00|initial|inherit)$/i],
+  'text-align': [/^(left|right|center|justify|initial|inherit)$/i],
+}
+
+// Characters a browser drops from a URL before it reads the scheme.
+const URL_IGNORED = /[\x00-\x20\x7f]+/g
+const URL_SCHEME = /^([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*):/i
+
+/**
+ * True when `url` (entity-decoded by the parser) is relative or uses an
+ * allowed scheme once the characters a browser ignores are removed, and
+ * parses as a URL (bluemonday requires a parseable URL too). sanitize-html
+ * checks the scheme as well; checking here keeps the layer's rule from
+ * depending on sanitize-html's defaults.
+ */
+function allowedUrl(url: string): boolean {
+  const scheme = URL_SCHEME.exec(url.replace(URL_IGNORED, ''))
+  if (scheme && !JOURNAL_ALLOWED_SCHEMES.includes(scheme[1]!.toLowerCase())) return false
+  // new URL, not URL.canParse, which Safari before 17 lacks.
+  try {
+    new URL(url, 'https://journal.invalid/')
+    return true
+  } catch {
+    return false
+  }
+}
+
+// Runs before sanitize-html's own attribute filter: drops every attribute
+// whose value fails its pattern. sanitize-html then drops attributes that
+// are not allowed on the element at all. Lookups are own-property only, so
+// a tag or attribute named "constructor" or "toString" finds no rule.
+function filterAttributeValues(tagName: string, attribs: sanitizeHtml.Attributes): sanitizeHtml.Tag {
+  const own = Object.hasOwn(ELEMENT_ATTRS, tagName) ? ELEMENT_ATTRS[tagName] : undefined
+  const kept: sanitizeHtml.Attributes = {}
+  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(attribs)) {
+    let rule: ValueRule | undefined
+    if (own && Object.hasOwn(own, name)) rule = own[name]
+    else if (Object.hasOwn(GLOBAL_ATTRS, name)) rule = GLOBAL_ATTRS[name]
+    if (rule === undefined) continue
+    if (rule === null ? name === 'style' || allowedUrl(value) : rule.test(value)) kept[name] = value
+  }
+  return { tagName, attribs: kept }
+}
+
+const allowedAttributes: Record<string, string[]> = { '*': Object.keys(GLOBAL_ATTRS) }
+for (const [tag, attrs] of Object.entries(ELEMENT_ATTRS)) allowedAttributes[tag] = Object.keys(attrs)
+
+// allowedEmptyAttributes is a sanitize-html option that @types/sanitize-html
+// does not declare yet.
+type Options = sanitizeHtml.IOptions & { allowedEmptyAttributes: string[] }
+
+// Attributes whose pattern accepts an empty value. Both configs below write
+// them as name="", so an empty value compares equal.
+const EMPTY_ATTRS = ['alt', 'title', 'summary', 'abbr', 'itemscope', 'open', 'nowrap']
+
+const POLICY: Options = {
+  allowedTags: [...JOURNAL_ALLOWED_TAGS],
+  allowedAttributes,
+  allowedStyles: { '*': ALLOWED_STYLES },
+  allowedSchemes: [...JOURNAL_ALLOWED_SCHEMES],
+  allowedSchemesByTag: {},
+  allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes: ['href', 'src', 'cite'],
+  allowProtocolRelative: true,
+  allowedEmptyAttributes: EMPTY_ATTRS,
+  // A refused element is dropped and its text kept, except in these, whose
+  // content is never shown as text (bluemonday skips the same content).
+  disallowedTagsMode: 'discard',
+  nonTextTags: ['script', 'style', 'textarea', 'option', 'noscript', 'title', 'iframe', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'object', 'xmp', 'template'],
+  transformTags: { '*': filterAttributeValues },
+}
+
+// The same parser and serializer with nothing refused: the reference that
+// isSafeJournalHtml compares the policy's output with.
+const KEEP_ALL: Options = {
+  allowedTags: false,
+  allowedAttributes: false,
+  allowVulnerableTags: true,
+  allowedSchemes: [],
+  allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes: [],
+  nonTextTags: [],
+  allowedEmptyAttributes: EMPTY_ATTRS,
+  nonBooleanAttributes: [],
 }

 /**
- * Gate result for a v-html sink: `html` is the input when safe and "" when
- * not, so the unsafe value never reaches the DOM. Null input is safe and "".
+ * Sanitizes journal HTML with the Journal policy. Whatever the policy does
+ * not allow is removed (the text of a removed element is kept, except for
+ * script, style and similar), so the result is never blank because of one
+ * stray attribute. Null or empty input gives "". Pure and deterministic: the
+ * same input gives the same string on the server and in the browser.
+ */
+export function sanitizeJournalHtml(html: string | null | undefined): string {
+  if (!html) return ''
+  return sanitizeHtml(html, POLICY)
+}
+
+/**
+ * True when the policy keeps `html` whole: sanitizing it removes no element,
+ * attribute or text and only normalizes how the markup is written. The
+ * counterpart of the plugin's CheckHTML. Null or empty input is safe.
+ */
+export function isSafeJournalHtml(html: string | null | undefined): boolean {
+  return gateJournalHtml(html).safe
+}
+
+/**
+ * Gate result for a v-html sink. `html` is always the sanitized value and is
+ * what the sink renders; `safe` reports whether the policy kept the input
+ * whole (isSafeJournalHtml). It never blanks: unsafe parts are removed, not
+ * the value. Null or empty input is safe and "".
 */
 export function gateJournalHtml(html: string | null | undefined): { safe: boolean; html: string } {
  if (!html) return { safe: true, html: '' }
-  return isSafeJournalHtml(html) ? { safe: true, html } : { safe: false, html: '' }
+  const clean = sanitizeHtml(html, POLICY)
+  return { safe: clean === sanitizeHtml(html, KEEP_ALL), html: clean }
 }
--- a/app/utils/postView.ts
+++ b/app/utils/postView.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+// The post page's SSR payload: the post with its body sanitized, without the
+// raw `content` source or `translations`, and with related posts as list
+// rows. Kept apart from view.ts because it loads the sanitizer, which list
+// pages and cards do not need.
+
+import { sanitizeJournalHtml } from './htmlGate.ts'
+import type { JournalPostDetail } from './types.ts'
+import { toListPost } from './view.ts'
+
+/** A post page's data: the post with its body sanitized and no source or translations. */
+export type JournalPostView = JournalPostDetail
+
+export function toPostView(post: JournalPostDetail): JournalPostView {
+  return {
+    ...post,
+    content: null,
+    translations: null,
+    content_html: sanitizeJournalHtml(post.content_html),
+    related_posts: (post.related_posts ?? []).map(toListPost),
+  }
+}
--- a/app/utils/view.ts
+++ b/app/utils/view.ts
@@ -1,21 +1,16 @@
 // View shaping for SSR payloads. Pages run API rows through these in
 // useAsyncData's transform, so the serialized payload carries only what the
-// page renders: no raw `content` source, no `translations`, and never an HTML
-// body that failed the Journal gate.
+// page renders: no raw `content` source and no `translations`. The post
+// page's view, which sanitizes the body, is in postView.ts, so list pages and
+// cards that import this file do not load the sanitizer.

-import { gateJournalHtml } from './htmlGate.ts'
-import type { JournalPost, JournalPostDetail } from './types.ts'
+import type { JournalPost } from './types.ts'

 /** A post row as a list or card renders it: without body, source or translations. */
 export function toListPost(post: JournalPost): JournalPost {
  return { ...post, content: null, content_html: null, translations: null }
 }

-/** A post page's data: the gated body, with `content_blocked` set when the gate refused it. */
-export interface JournalPostView extends JournalPostDetail {
-  content_blocked: boolean
-}
-
 /**
 * Formats an API timestamp as a long date for `language` (a BCP 47 tag such
 * as "pl-PL"). UTC on both server and browser, so hydration matches. Returns
@@ -31,15 +26,3 @@ export function formatJournalDate(iso: string | null | undefined, language: stri
    return new Intl.DateTimeFormat('en', { dateStyle: 'long', timeZone: 'UTC' }).format(d)
  }
 }
-
-export function toPostView(post: JournalPostDetail): JournalPostView {
-  const gated = gateJournalHtml(post.content_html)
-  return {
-    ...post,
-    content: null,
-    translations: null,
-    content_html: gated.html,
-    content_blocked: !gated.safe,
-    related_posts: (post.related_posts ?? []).map(toListPost),
-  }
-}
--- a/i18n/locales/en.json
+++ b/i18n/locales/en.json
@@ -16,8 +16,7 @@
      "by": "By",
      "related": "Related posts",
      "previous": "Previous post",
-      "next": "Next post",
-      "contentUnavailable": "This content cannot be displayed."
+      "next": "Next post"
    },
    "category": {
      "empty": "There are no posts in this category yet."
--- a/i18n/locales/pl.json
+++ b/i18n/locales/pl.json
@@ -16,8 +16,7 @@
      "by": "Autor:",
      "related": "Powiązane wpisy",
      "previous": "Poprzedni wpis",
-      "next": "Następny wpis",
-      "contentUnavailable": "Nie można wyświetlić tej treści."
+      "next": "Następny wpis"
    },
    "category": {
      "empty": "W tej kategorii nie ma jeszcze wpisów."
--- a/testing/expect-acme.txt
+++ b/testing/expect-acme.txt
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 # Single post
 200 /blog/hello-acme contains=Hello Acme
 404 /blog/missing-post
-200 /blog/unsafe-sample contains=journal-post-body--blocked notcontains=alert(
+200 /blog/unsafe-sample contains=<p>Before</p><p>After</p> notcontains=alert(
 404 /blog/draft-note

 # Post index and pagination (9 per page, 13 published posts: 2 pages)
--- a/tests/htmlGate.test.ts
+++ b/tests/htmlGate.test.ts
@@ -1,64 +1,211 @@
-// The HTML gate mirrors the Journal plugin's FormatHTML / CheckHTML gate.
-// The unsafe cases are the six of TestFormatHTMLRejectsUnsafeHTML in
-// sm-journal-plugin classes/format_html_test.go, as rendered HTML.
+// The Journal HTML sanitizer mirrors the Journal plugin's bluemonday policy
+// (classes/format_html.go). The unsafe cases are the six of
+// TestFormatHTMLRejectsUnsafeHTML plus every bypass from the Phase 16.1 code
+// review (CR-01), as rendered HTML. Each one must come out without the
+// dangerous part while the safe text around it stays.
 import { test } from 'node:test'
 import assert from 'node:assert/strict'
-import { DANGEROUS_URL, EVENT_HANDLER, UNSAFE_TAG, gateJournalHtml, isSafeJournalHtml } from '../app/utils/htmlGate.ts'
+import { gateJournalHtml, isSafeJournalHtml, sanitizeJournalHtml } from '../app/utils/htmlGate.ts'

-const GO_CASES: Array<[string, string]> = [
-  ['script', '<script>alert(1)</script>'],
-  ['iframe', '<iframe src="https://evil.test"></iframe>'],
-  ['event', '<img src=x onerror="alert(1)">'],
-  ['javascript', '<a href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a>'],
-  ['vbscript', '<a href="vbscript:msgbox(1)">x</a>'],
-  ['data', '<a href="data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg==">x</a>'],
+// Signs that something executable or navigating survived.
+const DANGER = [
+  /<script/i,
+  /<svg/i,
+  /<math/i,
+  /<iframe/i,
+  /<object/i,
+  /<embed/i,
+  /<base/i,
+  /<meta/i,
+  /<form/i,
+  /<input/i,
+  /<style/i,
+  /\son[a-z]+\s*=/i,
+  /javascript/i,
+  /vbscript/i,
+  /href="data:/i,
+  /src="data:/i,
+  /xlink:href/i,
+  /evil\.test/i,
 ]

-test('the patterns are the Go regex sources, case-insensitive', () => {
-  assert.equal(UNSAFE_TAG.source, '<(?:script|iframe|object|embed)\\b')
-  assert.equal(EVENT_HANDLER.source, '\\son[a-z]+\\s*=')
-  assert.equal(DANGEROUS_URL.source, '(?:javascript|vbscript|data):')
-  for (const re of [UNSAFE_TAG, EVENT_HANDLER, DANGEROUS_URL]) assert.ok(re.flags.includes('i'))
-})
+function assertNeutralized(html: string, label: string): string {
+  const out = sanitizeJournalHtml(html)
+  for (const re of DANGER) assert.doesNotMatch(out, re, `${label}: ${out}`)
+  assert.equal(isSafeJournalHtml(html), false, `${label} reported safe`)
+  assert.deepEqual(gateJournalHtml(html), { safe: false, html: out }, label)
+  return out
+}

-for (const [name, html] of GO_CASES) {
-  test(`Go case ${name} is unsafe`, () => {
-    assert.equal(isSafeJournalHtml(html), false)
-    assert.deepEqual(gateJournalHtml(html), { safe: false, html: '' })
-  })
+const GO_CASES: Array<[string, string]> = [
+  ['script', '<p>keep</p><script>alert(1)</script>'],
+  ['iframe', '<p>keep</p><iframe src="https://evil.test"></iframe>'],
+  ['event', '<p>keep<img src=x onerror="alert(1)"></p>'],
+  ['javascript', '<a href="javascript:alert(1)">keep</a>'],
+  ['vbscript', '<a href="vbscript:msgbox(1)">keep</a>'],
+  ['data', '<a href="data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg==">keep</a>'],
+]

-  test(`Go case ${name} in upper case is unsafe`, () => {
-    const upper = html.toUpperCase()
-    assert.equal(isSafeJournalHtml(upper), false)
-    assert.deepEqual(gateJournalHtml(upper), { safe: false, html: '' })
+// CR-01: payloads the three-regex gate let through, and their neighbours.
+const REVIEW_BYPASSES: Array<[string, string]> = [
+  ['attribute without a space', '<p>keep<img src="x"onerror="alert(1)"></p>'],
+  ['svg with slash separator', '<div>\n<svg/onload=alert(1)>\n</div><p>keep</p>'],
+  ['numeric entity colon', '<a href="javascript&#58;alert(1)">keep</a>'],
+  ['named entity colon', '<a href="javascript&colon;alert(1)">keep</a>'],
+  ['entity in the scheme', '<a href="&#106;avascript:alert(1)">keep</a>'],
+  ['tab in the scheme', '<a href="java\tscript:alert(1)">keep</a>'],
+  ['newline in the scheme', '<a href="java\nscript:alert(1)">keep</a>'],
+  ['leading control characters', '<a href="\u0001 javascript:alert(1)">keep</a>'],
+  ['upper case scheme', '<a href="JAVASCRIPT:alert(1)">keep</a>'],
+  ['MathML xlink:href', '<div>\n<math><maction actiontype=statusline xlink:href="javascript&#58;alert(1)">keep</maction></math>\n</div>'],
+  ['base', '<base href="https://evil.test/"><p>keep</p>'],
+  ['meta refresh', '<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=https://evil.test"><p>keep</p>'],
+  ['form phish', '<form action="https://evil.test"><input type=password name=p></form><p>keep</p>'],
+  ['embed', '<embed src="https://evil.test/x.swf"><p>keep</p>'],
+  ['object', '<object data="https://evil.test/x"></object><p>keep</p>'],
+  ['data image src', '<p>keep<img src=""></p>'],
+  ['style element', '<style>body{background:url(https://evil.test/x)}</style><p>keep</p>'],
+  ['css url in style attribute', '<p style="background:url(https://evil.test/x)">keep</p>'],
+  ['css expression in colour', '<p style="color: expression(alert(1))">keep</p>'],
+  ['noscript title breakout', '<noscript><p title="</noscript><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"></p></noscript><p>keep</p>'],
+  ['handler in upper case', '<P ONMOUSEOVER="alert(1)">keep</P>'],
+]
+
+for (const [name, html] of [...GO_CASES, ...REVIEW_BYPASSES]) {
+  test(`${name} is neutralized and the rest is kept`, () => {
+    const out = assertNeutralized(html, name)
+    assert.match(out, /keep/, `${name} lost the safe text: ${out}`)
  })
 }

-test('object and embed tags and spaced handlers are unsafe', () => {
-  assert.equal(isSafeJournalHtml('<object data="x"></object>'), false)
-  assert.equal(isSafeJournalHtml('<embed src="x">'), false)
-  assert.equal(isSafeJournalHtml('<div\nonclick = "x">'), false)
+test('the Go cases in upper case are neutralized', () => {
+  for (const [name, html] of GO_CASES) assertNeutralized(html.toUpperCase(), `${name} upper`)
 })

-test('headings, tables, footnotes and links are safe and pass unchanged', () => {
-  const safe = [
-    '<h1>Hello</h1>',
-    '<table><thead><tr><th>a</th><th>b</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr></tbody></table>',
-    '<p>See footnote.<sup id="fnref:1"><a href="#fn:1" class="footnote-ref">1</a></sup></p>',
-    '<p><a href="https://grzybyfunkcjonalne.pl/blog">Artykuły</a> <img src="/storage/app/media/las.webp" alt="las"></p>',
+test('comments are dropped; a comment is not content, so the input still counts as safe', () => {
+  const html = '<!--<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>--><p>keep</p>'
+  assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml(html), '<p>keep</p>')
+  assert.deepEqual(gateJournalHtml(html), { safe: true, html: '<p>keep</p>' })
+})
+
+test('unsafe parts are removed, not the whole value', () => {
+  assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml('<p>Before</p><script>alert(1)</script><p>After</p>'), '<p>Before</p><p>After</p>')
+  assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml('<p><img src="x"onerror="alert(1)"> tekst</p>'), '<p><img src="x" /> tekst</p>')
+  assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml('<a href="javascript&#58;alert(1)">link</a>'), '<a>link</a>')
+})
+
+test('text that names a scheme is ordinary text (WR-01)', () => {
+  const texts = [
+    '<p>Data: 12 maja 2024</p>',
+    '<p>Data publikacji: 3 czerwca 2025</p>',
+    '<p>The metadata: title, author and date.</p>',
+    '<p>Big data: what it means. JavaScript: a language. vbscript: legacy.</p>',
  ]
-  for (const html of safe) {
+  for (const html of texts) {
+    assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml(html), html)
    assert.equal(isSafeJournalHtml(html), true, html)
    assert.deepEqual(gateJournalHtml(html), { safe: true, html })
  }
 })

-test('words starting with "on" are not handlers without an =', () => {
-  assert.equal(isSafeJournalHtml('<p class="content">one of the onions</p>'), true)
+// The author footer of an imported post (post 64), without its <style> block.
+const AUTHOR_FOOTER = `<footer class="author-footer" itemscope itemtype="https://schema.org/Person">
+  <div class="author-info">
+    <img src="https://blog.acme.test/storage/app/media/Jane%20Doe.png" alt="Zdjęcie autora Jane Doe" class="author-photo" itemprop="image">
+    <div class="author-details">
+      <div style="font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;" itemprop="name">Jane Doe</div>
+      <span style="color: #138c74;" itemprop="jobTitle">Ekspert Mykologii</span>
+      <p itemprop="description">Jestem entuzjastką grzybów, szczególnie tych funkcjonalnych.</p>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+</footer>`
+
+test('an imported author footer keeps classes, microdata and inline styles', () => {
+  const out = sanitizeJournalHtml(AUTHOR_FOOTER)
+  assert.equal(isSafeJournalHtml(AUTHOR_FOOTER), true)
+  for (const part of [
+    '<footer class="author-footer" itemscope="" itemtype="https://schema.org/Person">',
+    '<div class="author-info">',
+    '<img src="https://blog.acme.test/storage/app/media/Jane%20Doe.png" alt="Zdjęcie autora Jane Doe" class="author-photo" itemprop="image" />',
+    '<div style="font-size:1.5em;font-weight:bold" itemprop="name">Jane Doe</div>',
+    '<span style="color:#138c74" itemprop="jobTitle">Ekspert Mykologii</span>',
+    '<p itemprop="description">',
+  ]) {
+    assert.ok(out.includes(part), `missing ${part} in ${out}`)
+  }
+})
+
+test('the footer with its <style> block loses only the style block', () => {
+  const html = `${AUTHOR_FOOTER}\n<style>\n  .author-footer { padding: 20px; }\n</style>\n<hr>`
+  const out = sanitizeJournalHtml(html)
+  assert.equal(isSafeJournalHtml(html), false)
+  assert.doesNotMatch(out, /<style|padding/)
+  assert.equal(out, `${sanitizeJournalHtml(AUTHOR_FOOTER)}\n\n<hr />`)
+})
+
+test('inline styles keep only the four allowed properties with valid values', () => {
+  assert.equal(
+    sanitizeJournalHtml('<p style="color: red; font-size: 12px; font-weight: 700; text-align: center; position: fixed">x</p>'),
+    '<p style="color:red;font-size:12px;font-weight:700;text-align:center">x</p>',
+  )
+  assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml('<p style="color: rgb(1, 2, 3)">x</p>'), '<p style="color:rgb(1, 2, 3)">x</p>')
+  assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml('<p style="font-size: calc(1px + 1em)">x</p>'), '<p>x</p>')
+  assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml('<p style="position: fixed">x</p>'), '<p>x</p>')
+})
+
+test('goldmark markup passes whole: headings, tables, footnotes, links and images', () => {
+  const safe = [
+    '<h1>Hello</h1>',
+    '<table><thead><tr><th>a</th><th style="text-align:right">b</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>2</td></tr></tbody></table>',
+    '<p>See footnote.<sup id="fnref:1"><a href="#fn:1" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">1</a></sup></p>',
+    '<div class="footnotes" role="doc-endnotes"><hr /><ol><li id="fn:1"><p>Note. <a href="#fnref:1" class="footnote-backref" role="doc-backlink">↩︎</a></p></li></ol></div>',
+    '<p><a href="https://blog.acme.test/blog">Artykuły</a> <img src="/storage/app/media/las.webp" alt="las" /></p>',
+    '<p><a href="mailto:hello@acme.test">mail</a> <a href="//cdn.acme.test/x">cdn</a> <a href="?page=2">page</a></p>',
+    '<blockquote cite="https://acme.test/source"><p>Quote</p></blockquote>',
+    '<p class="content">one of the onions</p>',
+  ]
+  for (const html of safe) {
+    assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml(html), html)
+    assert.deepEqual(gateJournalHtml(html), { safe: true, html })
+  }
+})
+
+test('pasted chat transcripts keep dir="auto" and the two data attributes only', () => {
+  const html = '<div dir="auto" data-message-author-role="user" data-message-id="abc-123">Hi</div>'
+  assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml(html), html)
+  assert.equal(
+    sanitizeJournalHtml('<div data-message-author-role="a b" data-other="x" dir="sideways">Hi</div>'),
+    '<div>Hi</div>',
+  )
+})
+
+test('attribute values must match their patterns', () => {
+  assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml('<p itemtype="https://evil.test/Person">x</p>'), '<p>x</p>')
+  assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml('<p class="a&quot;b">x</p>'), '<p>x</p>')
+  assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml('<a role="button" href="/x">x</a>'), '<a href="/x">x</a>')
+  assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml('<td colspan="2;">x</td>'), '<td>x</td>')
+  assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml('<a href="http://[bad">x</a>'), '<a>x</a>')
+  assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml('<a target="_blank" rel="opener" href="/x">x</a>'), '<a href="/x">x</a>')
+})
+
+test('attribute and tag names from Object.prototype find no rule', () => {
+  assert.equal(
+    sanitizeJournalHtml('<a constructor="x" tostring="y" __proto__="z" href="/a">x</a><constructor>t</constructor>'),
+    '<a href="/a">x</a>t',
+  )
+})
+
+test('sanitizing is idempotent, so server and client agree on a sanitized body', () => {
+  const inputs = [AUTHOR_FOOTER, ...REVIEW_BYPASSES.map(([, html]) => html), ...GO_CASES.map(([, html]) => html)]
+  for (const html of inputs) {
+    const once = sanitizeJournalHtml(html)
+    assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml(once), once, html)
+  }
 })

 test('empty input is safe and empty', () => {
  for (const html of [null, undefined, '']) {
+    assert.equal(sanitizeJournalHtml(html), '')
    assert.equal(isSafeJournalHtml(html), true)
    assert.deepEqual(gateJournalHtml(html), { safe: true, html: '' })
  }