`cmdVerifyKeyLinks` resolved `from:` and `to:` with `path.join(cwd, <value>)` where the value comes verbatim from plan YAML. `path.join` normalizes `../` rather than rejecting it, so a plan travelling with a repository could name any file the process can read, and the command reports whether the link's `pattern` matched it — an arbitrary-file-read oracle reachable from `verify-phase`. Both reads now go through `validatePath` in src/security.cts, the existing realpath-based confinement seam already used at 11 call sites. Not a missing capability — a bypassed one. Two defects in that seam, found by adversarial review and fixed here because they affect all 11 callers: 1. A dangling in-project symlink escaped confinement. A link to an EXISTING outside path was refused (realpath lands outside) while a link to a MISSING outside path took the parent-resolution fallback and was accepted — an existence oracle for arbitrary absolute paths. lstat succeeds on a dangling link and throws ENOENT on a truly absent path; an unresolvable link is now refused. A symlink resolving inside the project is still accepted. 2. A canonicalized base was compared against an uncanonicalized path when a file and its parent were both missing, wrongly refusing legitimate in-project paths on any non-canonical cwd (every macOS temp dir). This was a live regression in this PR: the wave-pending classification (#1202) depends on the not-yet-created case. Resolution now walks up to the nearest existing ancestor. Two adjacent aborts fixed: the from: read sat outside the per-link try, so a non-ENOENT errno killed the whole command; and an empty from: read the cwd directory, throwing EISDIR. Both now fail per-link. The issue was filed as a fourth ADR-0174 consolidation loss. It is not one — validatePath/requireSafePath never went away, only the SDK's name for the concept did. This is an instance of epic #3473's F2 family. The ADR-0174 loss count is three. Closes #3493 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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