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* fix(#1577): isolate WebFetch/WebSearch ingress + opt-in injection blocking Split A of #1573 (security-critical). Scans WebFetch/WebSearch output (the largest untrusted channel) in gsd-read-injection-scanner; shared untrusted-input-boundary reference @-included by the 8 ingest agents (randomized per-wrap delimiters, in-prompt self-scan guard, task-anchoring); opt-in security.injection_blocking (default advisory — non-breaking). arXiv: 2506.05739 (PPA), 2507.15219 (PromptArmor), 2504.20472 (Referencing), 2503.00061 (defense-in-depth). * fix(#1577): address review — honest blocking docs, config key, ADR, property test, revert localized - A1: rewrote the opt-in-blocking doc + Security changeset honestly — the PostToolUse hook is a circuit-breaker (halts the agent's next step), NOT a redactor; it does not scrub content already in the transcript. The prompt-level data/instruction boundary is the primary control. - A2: registered security.injection_blocking in the config schema + defaults manifests (default false) + an e2e config-roundtrip test; the dotted setter writes the nested shape the hook reads. - A3: reverted the 4 hand-edited localized security-model.md (canonical EN only, per convention). - A5: ADR-1577 (untrusted-input boundary + opt-in blocking; redaction-vs-circuit-breaker rationale). - A6: property test — scanner never crashes / only emits valid JSON on unicode/large/malformed input. - Also: inventory (untrusted-input-boundary.md) + agent-size baseline (8 ingest agents) + drift-guard matcher update (Read -> Read|WebFetch|WebSearch). A7 (content<20 early-exit) left as the noted pre-existing follow-up. * fix(#1577): allowlist untrusted-input-boundary.md in injection-scan CI gate The new reference quotes injection phrases ('ignore previous instructions', 'you are now…') as examples agents must NOT comply with, tripping the repo's own prompt-injection-scan.sh diff gate (the standalone 'security' CI job, red on HEAD). Allowlist it alongside the other security docs (security-model.md, TEST-EXAMPLES.md) that legitimately demonstrate injection patterns. The JS scanner test doesn't scan references/, so only the shell gate needed it. Verified: scan --diff origin/next -> 0 findings; scanner JS test 15/15. * fix(#1577): cover AC #2's gsd-ui-researcher + gsd-assumptions-analyzer trek-e Major 1: the @-included set dropped two AC #2 agents. Restore them so no named web-ingress agent is uncovered, keeping the two justified additions (gsd-ai-researcher, gsd-domain-researcher). Final set = AC's 8 + 2 = 10. - gsd-ui-researcher carries the full WebSearch/WebFetch + MCP-fetch toolset. - gsd-assumptions-analyzer reads 5-15 codebase source files (external/source- document ingress per the boundary), though it has no web tools. INGEST_AGENTS in the isolation test now asserts all 10; size baselines regenerated (+60 bytes each, both well under the DEFAULT cap); changeset reworded 8 -> 10. Verified: untrusted-input-isolation 14/14; agent-size-budget 39/39. * docs(#1577): document security.injection_blocking + boundary seam trek-e Major 2 + Minor: - docs/CONFIGURATION.md: add the top-level security.injection_blocking key to the Full Schema and a Security Settings subsection, distinguishing it from the workflow.security_* namespace; honest circuit-breaker-not-redactor framing matching ADR-1577 / security-model. - CONTEXT.md: add the 'Untrusted-input boundary' seam glossary entry. Verified: lint:docs ok; config-field-docs + contributor-standards green. * test(#1577): make read-injection property test git-text, not binary trek-e nit (and more): the file embedded a raw U+FFFF AND a raw NUL byte as degenerate-edge inputs. The NUL is what actually made git classify it binary (git binary = NUL in first 8K). Replace both with text-safe escapes that keep the identical runtime values: '\\x00' and String.fromCodePoint(0xFFFF). File now diffs/blames line-by-line. Verified: property test 2/2; no NUL/raw-noncharacter bytes remain. * docs(#1577): align untrusted boundary docs Name all 10 ingress agents in INVENTORY/security-model and allowlist the intentional read-injection property corpus for the prompt-injection scanner. * docs(#1577): align ADR ingest agent count Update ADR-1577 from 8 to 10 ingest agents so it matches the actual boundary include set and the rest of the docs. --------- Co-authored-by: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com>
GSD Core
Git. Ship. Done.
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A light-weight meta-prompting, context engineering, and spec-driven development system for Claude Code, OpenCode, Gemini CLI, Kimi CLI, Kilo, Codex, Copilot, Cursor, Windsurf, and more.
What is GSD Core
GSD Core is a context-engineering and spec-driven development framework that drives AI coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Kimi CLI, Copilot, Cursor, and more) through a disciplined phase loop. It solves context rot — the quality degradation that accumulates as an AI fills its context window — by running all heavy research, planning, and execution work in fresh-context subagents while keeping your main session lean.
How it works
Each milestone repeats the same five-step loop, one phase at a time:
- Discuss — capture implementation decisions before anything is planned
- Plan — research, decompose, and verify the plan fits a fresh context window
- Execute — run plans in parallel waves; each executor starts with a clean 200k-token context
- Verify — walk through what was built; diagnose and fix before declaring done
- Ship — create the PR, archive the phase, repeat for the next one
Quickstart
npx @opengsd/gsd-core@latest
The installer prompts for your runtime (Claude Code, OpenCode, Gemini CLI, Kimi CLI, Kilo, Codex, Copilot, Cursor, Windsurf, and more) and whether to install globally or locally. The installer is required for cross-runtime compatibility — do not copy files from agents/ or commands/ directly.
On another runtime or without Node.js? See Install on your runtime.
Once installed, start your first project:
/gsd-new-project
New here? Follow Your first project for a guided walkthrough from install to first shipped phase.
Documentation
Tutorials — learning by doing:
How-to guides — task-focused recipes:
Reference — authoritative facts:
Explanation — concepts and design decisions:
Full index: docs/README.md. Other languages: 日本語 · 한국어 · Português · 简体中文.
Why it works
Most AI-coding setups fail at scale because context bloat silently degrades output quality, there is no shared memory between sessions, and nothing verifies that code actually works. GSD Core solves all three: heavy work runs in fresh subagents, structured artifacts like STATE.md and CONTEXT.md survive session boundaries, and the verify step walks through what was built and generates fix plans before a phase is declared done. See docs/explanation/context-engineering.md for the full reasoning.
Troubleshooting? See docs/how-to/recover-and-troubleshoot.md.
Community
| Project | Platform |
|---|---|
| gsd-opencode | Original OpenCode port |
| Discord | Community support |
Star History
License
MIT License. See LICENSE for details.
Claude Code is powerful. GSD Core makes it reliable.