a63684c222
* fix(#1577): isolate WebFetch/WebSearch ingress + opt-in injection blocking Split A of #1573 (security-critical). Scans WebFetch/WebSearch output (the largest untrusted channel) in gsd-read-injection-scanner; shared untrusted-input-boundary reference @-included by the 8 ingest agents (randomized per-wrap delimiters, in-prompt self-scan guard, task-anchoring); opt-in security.injection_blocking (default advisory — non-breaking). arXiv: 2506.05739 (PPA), 2507.15219 (PromptArmor), 2504.20472 (Referencing), 2503.00061 (defense-in-depth). * fix(#1577): address review — honest blocking docs, config key, ADR, property test, revert localized - A1: rewrote the opt-in-blocking doc + Security changeset honestly — the PostToolUse hook is a circuit-breaker (halts the agent's next step), NOT a redactor; it does not scrub content already in the transcript. The prompt-level data/instruction boundary is the primary control. - A2: registered security.injection_blocking in the config schema + defaults manifests (default false) + an e2e config-roundtrip test; the dotted setter writes the nested shape the hook reads. - A3: reverted the 4 hand-edited localized security-model.md (canonical EN only, per convention). - A5: ADR-1577 (untrusted-input boundary + opt-in blocking; redaction-vs-circuit-breaker rationale). - A6: property test — scanner never crashes / only emits valid JSON on unicode/large/malformed input. - Also: inventory (untrusted-input-boundary.md) + agent-size baseline (8 ingest agents) + drift-guard matcher update (Read -> Read|WebFetch|WebSearch). A7 (content<20 early-exit) left as the noted pre-existing follow-up. * fix(#1577): allowlist untrusted-input-boundary.md in injection-scan CI gate The new reference quotes injection phrases ('ignore previous instructions', 'you are now…') as examples agents must NOT comply with, tripping the repo's own prompt-injection-scan.sh diff gate (the standalone 'security' CI job, red on HEAD). Allowlist it alongside the other security docs (security-model.md, TEST-EXAMPLES.md) that legitimately demonstrate injection patterns. The JS scanner test doesn't scan references/, so only the shell gate needed it. Verified: scan --diff origin/next -> 0 findings; scanner JS test 15/15. * fix(#1577): cover AC #2's gsd-ui-researcher + gsd-assumptions-analyzer trek-e Major 1: the @-included set dropped two AC #2 agents. Restore them so no named web-ingress agent is uncovered, keeping the two justified additions (gsd-ai-researcher, gsd-domain-researcher). Final set = AC's 8 + 2 = 10. - gsd-ui-researcher carries the full WebSearch/WebFetch + MCP-fetch toolset. - gsd-assumptions-analyzer reads 5-15 codebase source files (external/source- document ingress per the boundary), though it has no web tools. INGEST_AGENTS in the isolation test now asserts all 10; size baselines regenerated (+60 bytes each, both well under the DEFAULT cap); changeset reworded 8 -> 10. Verified: untrusted-input-isolation 14/14; agent-size-budget 39/39. * docs(#1577): document security.injection_blocking + boundary seam trek-e Major 2 + Minor: - docs/CONFIGURATION.md: add the top-level security.injection_blocking key to the Full Schema and a Security Settings subsection, distinguishing it from the workflow.security_* namespace; honest circuit-breaker-not-redactor framing matching ADR-1577 / security-model. - CONTEXT.md: add the 'Untrusted-input boundary' seam glossary entry. Verified: lint:docs ok; config-field-docs + contributor-standards green. * test(#1577): make read-injection property test git-text, not binary trek-e nit (and more): the file embedded a raw U+FFFF AND a raw NUL byte as degenerate-edge inputs. The NUL is what actually made git classify it binary (git binary = NUL in first 8K). Replace both with text-safe escapes that keep the identical runtime values: '\\x00' and String.fromCodePoint(0xFFFF). File now diffs/blames line-by-line. Verified: property test 2/2; no NUL/raw-noncharacter bytes remain. * docs(#1577): align untrusted boundary docs Name all 10 ingress agents in INVENTORY/security-model and allowlist the intentional read-injection property corpus for the prompt-injection scanner. * docs(#1577): align ADR ingest agent count Update ADR-1577 from 8 to 10 ingest agents so it matches the actual boundary include set and the rest of the docs. --------- Co-authored-by: Tom Boucher <trekkie@nomorestars.com>
Changeset Fragments
This directory holds per-PR CHANGELOG fragments. Every PR with user-facing changes drops one (or more) <random-name>.md files here describing its CHANGELOG entry. Fragments are consolidated into the top-level CHANGELOG.md at release time.
Why
Two PRs that both edit the ### Fixed block of CHANGELOG.md always conflict on merge — git can't pick a serialization order without human input. Two PRs that each add a fresh .changeset/<unique-name>.md never conflict because they don't share lines.
See #2975 for the full rationale.
Adding a fragment
node scripts/changeset/new.cjs \
--type Fixed \
--pr 1234 \
--body "fix the thing — explain the user-visible change in one sentence"
This writes .changeset/<adjective>-<noun>-<noun>.md with frontmatter and a body. Three random words → concurrent PRs don't collide.
Format
---
type: Fixed
pr: 1234
---
**`/gsd-foo` no longer drops trailing slashes** — explain the user-visible change.
Allowed type: values follow Keep a Changelog: Added, Changed, Deprecated, Removed, Fixed, Security.
Opting out
PRs that legitimately have no user-facing impact can add the no-changelog label. CI honors it. When unsure, add the fragment.
At release time
Promotion is automatic. The release workflow's finalize job runs:
node scripts/changeset/cli.cjs render --version vX.Y.Z --date YYYY-MM-DD --allow-empty
This reads every fragment, groups bullets by type:, replaces ## [Unreleased] with a new ## [vX.Y.Z] - YYYY-MM-DD block, opens a fresh ## [Unreleased] above, and deletes consumed fragments. The --allow-empty flag ensures a no-change release still gets a dated heading (with a _No notable changes._ placeholder). A subsequent verify step confirms the promotion landed correctly. Maintainers do not run this by hand.
Archived fragments
.changeset/archived/ holds fragments for already-shipped releases (≤ 1.3.1), retained for provenance. Their content was hand-curated into the dated ## [1.x.y] sections of CHANGELOG.md during the #690 backfill — they were never consumed by render. All changeset tooling enumerates .changeset/ non-recursively, so archived fragments are never picked up or rendered. Do not move them back to the top level.