test(quick-261114-p5m): pin end tags inside quoted attributes in the mail URL check
- refuse cases for all eight probe payloads (noscript href and handler, svg style, title and textarea, noembed, xmp, conditional comment) - send fallback and editor refusal for the three that survive rendering - escaped_send subtests check svg title/textarea sends with an x/net/html parser oracle, scripting on and off - accept cases for conditional comments, quoted CSS, a safe noscript link and a literal comment opener in an attribute
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@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import (
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"errors"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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xhtml "golang.org/x/net/html"
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)
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// schemeFiller surrounds a case's markup, so a snippet that points at the
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@@ -15,7 +17,9 @@ var schemeFiller = strings.Repeat("plain words here ", 6)
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// rendered HTML (WR-05): prose and URLs that merely contain a scheme word
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// pass; every URL-bearing attribute, CSS, meta refresh and every
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// character-reference or whitespace-split spelling of a script or data URL
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// is refused, on a send with inlining on and off and in the editor.
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// is refused, on a send with inlining on and off and in the editor. A
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// raw-text end tag or a comment's end inside a quoted attribute does not hide
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// the rest of the tag (CR-02 residual).
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func TestURLSchemeCheck(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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@@ -34,6 +38,16 @@ func TestURLSchemeCheck(t *testing.T) {
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{"footer_handler_shaped_name", `<p>© 2026 Online=Shop</p>`},
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{"title_escaped_handler", `<svg><title><img onerror=x></title></svg>`},
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{"outlook_conditional_vml", `<!--[if mso]><v:roundrect href="https://example.com/" style="height:40px"><w:anchorlock/></v:roundrect><![endif]-->`},
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// The tag reading, where quoting decides where a tag ends, refuses
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// nothing mail uses (CR-02 residual).
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{"conditional_comment_quoted_attrs", `<!--[if mso]><table role="presentation" width="600"><tr><td style="padding:0"><![endif]-->`},
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{"conditional_comment_not_mso_safe_link", `<!--[if !mso]><!--><a href="https://example.com/">x</a><!--<![endif]-->`},
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{"style_css_quoted_strings", `<style>td[title="a > b"] { font-family: "Helvetica Neue", Arial; }</style>`},
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{"title_escaped_end_in_attr", `<svg><title><a title="</title>" href="javascript:x"></title></svg>`},
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{"noscript_safe_link_end_in_attr", `<noscript><a title="</noscript>" href="https://example.com/">Open</a></noscript>`},
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// Only the "<" of a comment opener is blanked, so a literal "<!--"
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// in an attribute value does not become a scheme prefix.
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{"href_literal_comment_opener", `<a href="<!--javascript:x">x</a>`},
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}
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for _, tc := range accepts {
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t.Run("accept/"+tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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@@ -87,6 +101,13 @@ func TestURLSchemeCheck(t *testing.T) {
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// the tokenizer but not for a conforming parser, which keeps the
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// rest of the tag together (CR-02 residual).
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{"svg_style_end_in_attr", `<svg><style><a title="</style>" href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a></style></svg>`, `href="javascript:alert(1)"`, schemeMsg},
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{"noscript_href_end_in_attr", `<noscript><a title="</noscript>" href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a></noscript>`, `href="javascript:alert(1)"`, schemeMsg},
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{"noscript_handler_end_in_attr", `<noscript><img title="</noscript>" src=x onerror=alert(1)></noscript>`, `onerror=alert(1)`, "event handlers"},
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{"svg_title_end_in_attr", `<svg><title><a title="</title>" href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a></title></svg>`, `href="javascript:alert(1)"`, schemeMsg},
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{"svg_textarea_end_in_attr", `<svg><textarea><a title="</textarea>" href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a></textarea></svg>`, `href="javascript:alert(1)"`, schemeMsg},
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{"noembed_end_in_attr", `<noembed><a title="</noembed>" href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a></noembed>`, `href="javascript:alert(1)"`, schemeMsg},
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{"xmp_end_in_attr", `<xmp><a title="</xmp>" href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a></xmp>`, `href="javascript:alert(1)"`, schemeMsg},
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{"conditional_comment_end_in_attr", `<!--[if mso]><a title="-->" href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a><![endif]-->`, `href="javascript:alert(1)"`, schemeMsg},
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// Whitespace-split schemes in list, meta, CSS and comment values
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// (WR-01).
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{"values_tab_split", `<svg><a><animate attributeName="href" values="java	script:alert(1)"/><text>x</text></a></svg>`, `values="java	script:alert(1)"`, schemeMsg},
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@@ -128,8 +149,12 @@ func TestURLSchemeCheck(t *testing.T) {
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{"noscript", `<noscript><a href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a></noscript>`},
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{"xmp", `<xmp><a href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a></xmp>`},
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// An end tag inside a quoted attribute does not hide the rest of the
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// tag (CR-02 residual).
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// tag (CR-02 residual). html/template escapes literal title and
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// textarea text, so the svg title and textarea variants are sent as
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// escaped text and checked by escaped_send below, not as fallbacks.
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{"svg_style_end_in_attr", `<svg><style><a title="</style>" href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a></style></svg>`},
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{"noscript_href_end_in_attr", `<noscript><a title="</noscript>" href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a></noscript>`},
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{"noscript_handler_end_in_attr", `<noscript><img title="</noscript>" src=x onerror=alert(1)></noscript>`},
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}
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file := fileWelcome(t)
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if strings.Contains(file.HTML, "javascript") {
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@@ -161,6 +186,52 @@ func TestURLSchemeCheck(t *testing.T) {
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}
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}
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// The svg title and textarea variants are escaped by html/template: the
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// override is sent, and a conforming parser, with scripting on and off,
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// builds no element with a handler or a script or data URL from it.
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escaped := []struct{ name, link string }{
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{"svg_title_end_in_attr", `<svg><title><a title="</title>" href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a></title></svg>`},
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{"svg_textarea_end_in_attr", `<svg><textarea><a title="</textarea>" href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a></textarea></svg>`},
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}
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for _, l := range escaped {
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for _, optOut := range []bool{false, true} {
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name := "escaped_send/" + l.name + "/inline"
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if optOut {
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name = "escaped_send/" + l.name + "/opt_out"
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}
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t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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drv := NewMemoryDriver()
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m := NewMailer(cat, drv, Options{Overrides: fakeOverrides{ov: Overrides{
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Template: &TemplateOverride{Subject: "Hello {{ .name }}", Body: "Hi **{{ .name }}**.", Layout: "encoded"},
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Layouts: map[string]LayoutOverride{"encoded": {
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HTML: `<html><head><style>{{ .css }}</style></head><body><div>{{ .Content }}` + l.link + `</div></body></html>`,
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Text: "{{ .Content }}",
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CSS: "p { color: #123456; }",
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DisableAutoInlineCSS: optOut,
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}},
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}}})
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sendWelcome(t, m, "")
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got := lastMessage(t, drv)
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if got.HTML == file.HTML {
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t.Fatalf("the override was refused; the file version was sent")
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}
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if !strings.Contains(got.HTML, "<a title=") {
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t.Errorf("the link was not sent as escaped text:\n%s", got.HTML)
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}
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for _, scripting := range []bool{true, false} {
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doc, err := xhtml.ParseWithOptions(strings.NewReader(got.HTML), xhtml.ParseOptionEnableScripting(scripting))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("parse (scripting %v): %v", scripting, err)
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}
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if live := liveUnsafeElements(doc); len(live) > 0 {
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t.Errorf("scripting %v: live unsafe attributes %v in:\n%s", scripting, live, got.HTML)
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}
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// The editor refuses the same layout draft on content_html, and a
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// layout's CSS with a script URL on content_css; prose in a template
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// body validates.
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@@ -206,6 +277,29 @@ func TestURLSchemeCheck(t *testing.T) {
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}
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}
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// liveUnsafeElements lists, as "element key=value", every attribute of an
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// element in the parsed tree n that is an event handler or a single-URL
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// attribute with a script or data URL, with the namespace prefix
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// unsafeMarkup builds.
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func liveUnsafeElements(n *xhtml.Node) []string {
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var live []string
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if n.Type == xhtml.ElementNode {
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for _, a := range n.Attr {
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key := a.Key
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if a.Namespace != "" {
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key = a.Namespace + ":" + a.Key
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}
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if strings.HasPrefix(key, "on") || urlAttributes[key] && hasDangerousScheme(a.Val) {
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live = append(live, n.Data+" "+key+"="+a.Val)
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}
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}
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}
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for c := n.FirstChild; c != nil; c = c.NextSibling {
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live = append(live, liveUnsafeElements(c)...)
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}
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return live
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}
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// TestInlineUnsafeOutput covers an inlined result that fails the safety
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// check (WR-05): the send succeeds with the checked, un-inlined HTML and its
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// style block, and one warning per layout per minute names the layout.
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